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ABSTRACT
Outbreaks of infectious diseases will worsen in the coming decades, as illustrated by the recent 
back-to-back Ebola and Zika epidemics.  The development of innovative drugs, especially in 
the form of vaccines, is key to minimizing the scale and impact of future outbreaks, yet current 
intellectual property (IP) regimes are ineffective in supporting this goal.
Scholarship has not adequately addressed the role of IP in the development of vaccines for outbreak 
diseases.  This Article fills that void.  Through case studies on the recent Ebola and Zika outbreaks, 
it provides the first descriptive analysis of the role of IP from the pre- to the post-outbreak stages, 
specifically identifying IP inefficiencies.
The Article concludes that these inefficiencies result in a lack of “IP preparedness” that ultimately 
weakens our ability to respond effectively to outbreaks.  To solve the problem, we need a blend of new 
and existing legal tools.  This Article surveys existing solutions and proposes a new legal mechanism: 
a dormant license, agreed upon in the pre-outbreak period, that would become active once a 
public health emergency is declared.  This solution addresses transactional IP inefficiencies during 
the early stages of an outbreak and helps get vaccines to the market more efficiently to save lives.
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Outbreaks1 of infectious diseases2 have risen exponentially from the late 
twentieth century onward,3 impacting populations across the globe and 
producing devastating effects on domestic and regional health systems.4  
Increased travel and connectivity, quick expansion of urban centers, and the 
ongoing worldwide population boom have all contributed to the increased 
frequency and magnitude of outbreaks.5  These same factors now lead scientists 
to predict that known infectious diseases will erupt more often in the 
foreseeable future with potentially catastrophic effects.6  In addition to this, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that, in the short-run, a 
  
1. The World Health Organization defines outbreaks as “the occurrence of cases of disease in 
excess of what would normally be expected in a defined community, geographical area or 
season.”  Disease Outbreaks, WORLD HEALTH ORG. http://www.who.int/topics/disease_ 
outbreaks/en [https://perma.cc/29AC-VBUY] (noting that an outbreak may be geographically 
limited or extend to multiple countries). 
2. The World Health Organization defines infectious diseases as those “caused by pathogenic 
microorganisms, such as bacteria, viruses, parasites or fungi; the diseases can be spread, 
directly or indirectly, from one person to another.”  Infectious Diseases, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., http://www.who.int/topics/infectious_diseases/en [https://perma.cc/5WM6-ULF5].  
This Article focuses on infectious diseases traditionally prevalent in the developing 
world, but now posing a risk to populations all over the globe.  The recent outbreaks of 
2014–16, which led to the first Ebola and Zika-related deaths in the United States, 
illustrate the spread of these diseases. 
3. See Kate E. Jones et al., Global Trends in Emerging Infectious Diseases, 451 NATURE 990, 990–
91 (2008) (noting a rise in infectious disease outbreaks already in the 1980s); Katherine F. 
Smith et al., Global Rise in Human Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 11 J. ROYAL SOC’Y 
INTERFACE 1, 3–4 (2014) (mapping the rise in worldwide outbreaks between 1980–2009). 
4. Jones et al., supra note 3, at 990.  See generally Peter Daszak, Anatomy of a Pandemic, 380 
LANCET 1883 (2012) (describing the evolution of pandemics in human history)  
5. See Meera Senthilingam, Seven Reasons We’re at More Risk Than Ever of a Global Pandemic, 
CNN (Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/03/health/pandemic-risk-virus-
bacteria/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZK8B-JTZV]; Julia Belluz, 4 Reasons Disease Outbreaks 
Are Erupting Around the World, VOX (May 31, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/ 
2016/5/31/11638796/why-there-are-more-infectious-disease-outbreaks [https://perma.cc/ 
7E9A-YSKN] (adding climate change to the list of factors that contribute to an accelerated 
pace and magnitude of infectious disease outbreaks); Bahar Gholipour, What 11 
Billion People Mean for Disease Outbreaks, SCI. AM. (Nov. 26, 2013), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-11-billion-people-mean-disease-outbreaks 
[https://perma.cc/KM3V-J56S] (describing the role of population growth as one of the key 
factors in the emergence of outbreak diseases). 
6. See Belluz, supra note 5. 
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novel pathogen is likely to result in the outbreak of “a new severe infectious 
disease.”7 
Against this backdrop, health systems are faced with insurmountable 
challenges in anticipating and proactively addressing future outbreaks.  Chief 
among these challenges is the fact that outbreaks remain inherently 
unpredictable.8  Even in the case of pathogens that are well-known or that have 
erupted recently—take the 2014–16 case of Ebola—the general consensus is 
that we are scarcely prepared to respond to upcoming outbreaks.9 
Currently, one of the key strategies to help reduce the scale and public-
health impact of future outbreaks is the development of new vaccines.10  This 
strategy leverages existing predictive information on emerging pathogens, 
however imperfect and limited that information might be, and it directs vaccine 
research and development (R&D) toward diseases for which there is a 
probability of outbreak in the near future.11  As of mid-2017, the WHO lists six 
diseases that need to be “urgently addressed” from an R&D perspective, 
including all strains of Ebola, the Middle East respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).12  A 
second tier of three outbreak diseases, deemed to be in need of increased R&D 
“as soon as possible,” includes the congenital and neurological problems caused 
  
7. WORLD HEALTH ORG., AN R&D BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION TO PREVENT EPIDEMICS 22 (2016) 
[hereinafter R&D BLUEPRINT] (describing diseases that need “to be urgently addressed”); 
see also Marie Paule Kieny et al., The Need for Global R&D Coordination for Infectious 
Diseases With Epidemic Potential, 388 LANCET 460, 460–61 (2016); Christopher Black, 
WHO Publishes List of Top Emerging Diseases Likely to Cause Major Epidemics, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.who.int/medicines/ebola-treatment/WHO-list-
of-top-emerging-diseases/en [https://perma.cc/9BUY-3Y2Y] (noting that the list was 
based on multidisciplinary calculations, including “virology, microbiology, immunology, 
public health, clinical medicine, mathematical and computational modelling, product 
development, and respiratory and severe emerging infections”).  
8. See, e.g., Stephen S. Morse et al., Prediction and Prevention of the Next Pandemic Zoonosis, 
380 LANCET 1956, 1956 (2012) (“The emergence of novel pandemic agents often seems to 
be inherently unpredictable.”); see also infra notes 39–41, and accompanying text 
(describing advances in predictive technology and its limitations). 
9. See CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POLICY, COMPLETING THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
EBOLA VACCINES 29–31 (2017), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/sites/default/files/public/ 
downloads/ebola_team_b_report_3-011717-final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS46-PD92] 
[hereinafter CIDRAP] (describing lack of preparedness for future Ebola outbreaks); see also 
Helen Branswell, We’re Not Prepared for Future Ebola Outbreaks, Experts Warn, STAT (Jan. 
17, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/01/17/ebola-vaccine-warning [https://perma.cc/ 
AWA6-UM8M]. 
10. See John‐Arne Røttingen et al., New Vaccines Against Epidemic Infectious Diseases, 376 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 610, 610–11 (2017). 
11. The WHO is the main aggregator of this type of information, used to create a list of 
“priority pathogens.”  See R&D BLUEPRINT, supra note 7, at 21–22. 
12. Id. at 22. 
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by the Zika virus.13  A significant portion of ongoing vaccine R&D thus targets 
some of these diseases, with Ebola and Zika R&D attracting the bulk of 
resources since the 2014–16 outbreaks.14 
However, vaccine development in this context faces hurdles that vastly 
surpass the unpredictability of outbreaks and insufficient levels of R&D.  Even 
when regarded through a specific lens (as in the case of this Article, which 
focuses solely on intellectual property (IP)),15 the development of vaccines 
targeting outbreak pathogens encompasses several IP stages.  These stages 
stretch well beyond the problems surrounding R&D16 and correspond to 
markedly different stages of an outbreak.  For instance, and as described in 
greater detail in the two case studies below, IP is not relevant merely as a means 
to incentivize risky and costly R&D on uncertain outbreak pathogens, although 
it undoubtedly performs this function in the pre-outbreak stages.17  Rather, it 
often surfaces in the early stages of an outbreak, when preexisting IP (such as 
vaccine technology that has not been fully developed) is used18 by entities that 
possess the capabilities to develop it in a short period of time.19  Later still, 
toward the end of the R&D process—and typically in late- or post-outbreak 
periods—IP may play yet another role if a successful vaccine developer lacks 
manufacturing capacity and decides to license it to another entity, as happened 
most recently (and controversially) in the case of the Zika vaccine developed by 
the U.S. Army.20 
IP literature dealing with drug development is becoming increasingly 
specialized in a salutary and fertile way,21 even though the tandem IP/vaccines 
  
13. Id. 
14. Infra note 165 and accompanying text (noting a 258 percent increase in funding for Ebola 
R&D in 2014 and 2015). 
15. For a perspective on how this problem unfolds with regard to the larger question of 
whether IP as a system of incentives is even appropriate to spur innovation in fields like 
outbreak diseases, see Douglas Lichtman, The Central Assumptions of Patent Law, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 1268 (2018). 
16. As in roles that IP plays in drug development in general, and vaccine development in 
particular.  For instance, and as detailed below, some of the roles of IP include establishing 
a set of incentives to biopharmaceutical innovation, conferring exclusive rights to drug 
innovators, the role of incentivizing innovation, and the role ensuring access to 
biopharmaceutical inventions by the public at large.  See infra Part II. 
17. For a description of limitations of the role of IP as an incentives mechanism in the context 
of infectious diseases, see infra Subpart I.B. 
18. Or unused, as was the case of one vaccine candidate during the Ebola outbreak.  See infra 
notes 284–292 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 282–292 and accompanying text.  
20. Infra notes 300–306 and accompanying text. 
21. See, e.g., Jacob S. Sherkow, Cancer’s IP, 96 N.C. L. REV. 297 (2018) (analyzing cancer from the IP 
and information policy perspectives); Rachel E. Sachs, The Unpatentable Microbiome, 116 
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remains significantly underexplored.  Literature, policy, and practice alike tend 
to focus disproportionately on the incentives side of IP,22 paying far less 
attention to other IP effects on the development of vaccines.23  More 
importantly, the different—yet interdependent—roles that IP plays in vaccine 
development in the context of infectious disease outbreaks need to be 
addressed both separately and collectively.  This Article is the first to address 
and analyze all IP angles in vaccine development, highlighting different types of 
inefficiencies that emerge at each stage of an outbreak and addressing solutions 
for each type of inefficiency.  It does so by turning to case studies on vaccine 
development prompted by the 2014–16 Ebola and Zika outbreaks. 
These back-to-back outbreaks provide a clear illustration of the multiple 
ways in which IP intersects with vaccine development and, more broadly, how 
IP ultimately helps shape the response to infectious disease outbreaks.  These 
case studies illustrate all types of IP inefficiencies at play during a complex 
outbreak24 and point to paths forward in the next outbreaks.  Looking ahead, 
some of the informal mechanisms that arose during the Ebola and Zika crises 
(such as streamlined IP negotiation models) can be adapted, and even 
formalized, for future use.25 
Yet, in applying the lessons from Ebola and Zika to future outbreaks in 
general, the Article goes one step further and makes an overarching point: 
Failure to address the differentiated roles of IP in vaccine development 
ultimately hinders our ability to respond effectively to outbreaks.  This is what I 
call a lack of IP preparedness.  Much has been written about pandemic 
preparedness26 and, more recently, R&D preparedness, which has been 
  
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript on file with author) (describing the IP challenges 
surrounding emerging technologies based on bacteria, viruses and protozoa living inside the 
human organism); Amy Kapczynski, Contagion: Between Property and the Commons in the 
WHO’s Global Influenza Surveillance Network (Sept. 23–24, 2011) (draft paper for Commons 
Conference), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_069673.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9F49-HLFZ] (describing the global flu network as part of the scientific commons). 
22. The scholarly focus on IP qua incentives is matched by the overwhelming focus on 
strategies to increase vaccine R&D in non-IP literature.  See, e.g., Røttingen, supra note 10, 
at 611. 
23. The ongoing controversy surrounding the Army-developed Zika vaccine is now calling 
attention to one of these other effects, albeit separately from other IP aspects that affected 
Zika R&D.  See infra notes 303–304 and accompanying text. 
24. These inefficiencies include incentives problems (described in Part I) and transactional IP 
problems (described in Part II), which break down into two subtypes: inefficiencies related 
to preexisting IP during the early stages of an outbreak, and inefficiencies related to 
emerging IP after an outbreak subsides. 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. See, e.g., R&D BLUEPRINT, supra note 7; CIDRAP, supra note 9; WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY PANDEMIC READINESS (2009), http://www.who.int/influenza/ 
1206 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200 (2018) 
	
described as the quest for “a novel R&D model” supporting the development of 
vaccines, treatments, and diagnostics before an outbreak occurs.27  At the same 
level, in the IP field there are widespread concerns surrounding the patent 
system as a mechanism of incentivizing biopharmaceutical R&D.28  To be sure, 
nuanced understandings of IP as a system of incentives, as well as a search for 
new incentives streams beyond the sphere of IP, are critically needed.29  But we 
also need to address the role of IP comprehensively in scenarios like infectious 
disease outbreaks, and so far we have failed to do so. 
As the case studies below illustrate, this failure may come at a hefty cost.  
Neglecting to consider certain aspects of transactional IP (such as transfer of 
certain IP rights from the original rights-holder to others) in the pre-outbreak 
stage might result in delays in technology-transfer during the early stages of an 
outbreak, when additional funding is often temporarily made available to 
develop a vaccine.30  To give but one example, further developed below, the 
licensing of the first-ever Zika vaccine, which has been shrouded in 
controversy, led Senator Bernie Sanders to publicly plead with the Trump 
administration to “avoid a bad Zika vaccine [licensing] deal” in early 2017.31  
The problems surrounding the Zika vaccine licensing deal are largely 
attributable to an overemphasis on IP rights as incentives to R&D, with little 
consideration being paid to the availability and affordability of the resulting 
vaccine(s) before the outbreak occurs. 
This Article advocates for an expanded focus on the multifaceted roles of 
IP in vaccine-development, as well as a corresponding tailoring of existing IP 
mechanisms—and the creation of new ones—to better suit the public health 
needs triggered by infectious disease outbreaks.  The Article begins by 
providing an overview and categorization of IP-related inefficiencies that 
specifically affect outbreak diseases.  Through case studies on the IP of the 
recent Ebola and Zika outbreaks, Parts I and II illustrate the public health 
impact of these inefficiencies, while also providing the first scholarly IP-based 
  
preparedness/pandemic/2009-0808_wos_pandemic_readiness_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
VDV4-2NGH] (laying a framework for pandemic preparedness at the economic, 
humanitarian and societal levels). 
27. R&D BLUEPRINT, supra note 7, at 6. 
28. See infra Subpart I.B. 
29. See generally Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best 
Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 51 (2002) (surveying non-patent 
mechanisms to incentivize R&D processes). 
30. See, e.g., infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
31. See Bernie Sanders, Bernie Sanders: Trump Should Avoid a Bad Zika Deal, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/opinion/bernie-sanders-trump-
should-avoid-a-bad-zika-deal.html?smid=tw-nytopinion&_r=0.  
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narrative of the vaccine races triggered by the Ebola and Zika crises.  Part III 
concludes by both surveying existing tools and developing new ones to reduce 
inefficiencies and thus increase our IP preparedness in future infectious disease 
outbreaks. 
I. INEFFICIENCIES AND LACK OF IP PREPAREDNESS IN THE PRE-
OUTBREAK PERIOD 
A. R&D Shortcomings of Outbreak Diseases 
Outbreak diseases present unique challenges to systemic and sustained 
R&D.  The lengthy and costly32 traditional model for developing vaccines and 
therapies is ill-suited to this specific type of disease.  As an outbreak occurs, 
funding for R&D on the offending pathogen often balloons, only to wane as the 
outbreak scales back.  Temporarily enhanced funding streams and resource 
mobilization might result in scientific and medical advancements33 or help 
push existing products through the development pipeline.34  But as these short-
lived streams diminish, R&D slows down and in some cases all but ceases.35 
In spite of the considerable burden outbreak diseases place on public 
health and regional economies36—and, in some cases, potentially on 
national security as well37—it is not hard to see why incentives to R&D in 
this field remain low.  Unlike mainstream diseases,38 outbreak diseases are, 
by definition, difficult to predict.  Although there are increasingly 
sophisticated early-detection tools39—from GPS-based tracking technology 
  
32. There is no agreement on the average cost of biopharmaceutical R&D.  See Dan L. Burk & 
Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1581 (2003) (noting the 
problems associated with statistical cost estimation in pharmaceutical R&D). 
33. This happened during the 2015–16 Zika outbreak, during which causal relationships 
between viral infection and neurological or congenital diseases were discovered.  See infra 
note 153 and accompanying text. 
34. That was the case with the leading Ebola vaccine candidate.  See infra Subpart II.B. 
35. See, e.g., infra note 325 and accompanying text. 
36. R&D BLUEPRINT, supra note 7, at 5 (describing how outbreak diseases affect “global health, 
security, and economic prospects”). 
37. Infra notes 122–123 and accompanying text. 
38. For example, cardiovascular diseases are the leading cause of death in both the developed 
and the developing worlds.  See, e.g., Cardiovascular Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs317/en [https://perma.cc/4G4N-LK3T] (last 
updated May 2017). 
39. See Eirini Christaki, New Technologies in Predicting, Preventing and Controlling Emerging 
Infectious Diseases, 6 VIRULENCE 558 (2015) (surveying the most common methods and 
technologies employed in global surveillance and modeling of infectious diseases); Michael 
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to complex predictive models40—anticipating an outbreak remains an 
elusive task.41 
Results from pre-outbreak R&D on a specific disease may also be of limited 
application when an actual outbreak occurs, as previously unknown strains of 
known pathogens present different characteristics.  Take the case of Ebola virus 
disease (EVD), which was first identified in 1976 in Sudan (Sudan ebolavirus) 
and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Zaire ebolavirus).  It 
was not until 1994 that a third EVD strain causing disease in humans was 
identified (Taï Forest ebolavirus).  And in 2007 yet another strain was discovered 
in Uganda (Bundibugyo ebolavirus).  In the meantime, a strain affecting 
nonhuman primates, and so far not known to cause disease in humans, was 
detected in Philippine macaques in 1989 in a lab in Virginia (Reston 
ebolavirus).42 
In addition to strain-specificity, pathogens also mutate over time.43  
Emerging research is now correlating the geographical spread of Zika (from 
Africa to Asia) to mutations in the viral genome.44  To be sure, pathogen 
mutation on its own does not account for the dearth of incentives surrounding 
outbreak diseases (for example, for the cost and risks associated with R&D in 
the field).  Research on many other diseases, both mainstream and neglected,45 
  
M. Wagner et al., The Emerging Science of Very Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks, 7 J. 
PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 51 (2001). 
40. See, e.g., Xia Jiang & Gregory F. Cooper, A Bayesian Spatio-Temporal Method for Disease 
Outbreak Detection, 17 J. AM. MED. INFO. ASS’N 462 (2010) (describing a probabilistic 
modeling system for emerging outbreak diseases). 
41. See John M. Drake, Limits to Forecasting Precision for Outbreaks of Directly Transmitted 
Diseases, 3 PLOS MED. 57, 57 (2006). 




43. This is also true of viruses associated with milder symptoms, such as the rhinovirus (which 
triggers common cold). 
44. See Leslie Goo et al., A Single Mutation in the Envelope Protein Modulates Flavivirus 
Antigenicity, Stability, and Pathogenesis, 13 PLOS PATHOGENS 1 (2017) (describing 
mutations in flaviviruses, the genus to which Zika belongs); John H.-O. Pettersson et al., 
How Did Zika Virus Emerge in the Pacific Islands and Latin America?, 7 MBIO 1, 1–2 (2016) 
(reporting amino acid changes in the viral genome as Zika spread from Africa, where it 
was first identified, to Asia, where the 2015–16 is likely to have started); Adriano de 
Bernardi Schneider et al., Molecular Evolution of Zika Virus As It Crossed the Pacific to the 
Americas, 33 CLADISTICS 1 (2017). 
45. The concept of “neglected diseases” often coincides with the category of “neglected tropical 
diseases,” which is described by the WHO as encompassing “a diverse group of 
communicable diseases that prevail in tropical and subtropical conditions in 149 
countries.” See Neglected Tropical Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ 
neglected_diseases/diseases/en [https://perma.cc/MSZ3-XJHQ]. 
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must contend with mutation variables.  The same can be said of disease 
complexity, as many other types of diseases present even greater degrees 
of complexity—consider the case of cancer46 or Alzheimer's disease.47 
However, when outbreak unpredictability, pathogen mutation, and 
disease complexity are coupled with the fact that outbreak markets have 
historically emerged in economically challenged areas, incentives for pre-
outbreak R&D become especially problematic.  Private-sector companies 
engaging in costly and risky48 R&D have greater motivation to focus resources 
on diseases more likely to generate enough revenue to recover R&D costs and 
turn a profit.  For this reason, industry funding for R&D on neglected diseases 
(of which outbreak diseases are a subset) amounts to only 15 percent of global 
funding,49 with most of the money being channeled into R&D on the “top-tier” 
neglected diseases: HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.50  
Other players in the field, such as international organizations, health-
oriented public-private partnerships (such as the Medicines for Malaria 
Venture,51 a Gates-funded vaccine alliance), and nonprofits (such as DNDi,52 
the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative), face multiple limitations.53  Even 
when allocating the bulk of their resources to R&D on neglected diseases, 
  
46. See, e.g., Sherkow, supra note 21. 
47. See David A. Bennett, Mixed Pathologies and Neural Reserve: Implications of Complexity 
for Alzheimer Disease Drug Discovery, 14 PLOS MED. 1 (2017). 
48. R&D is risky in the sense that investment of large amounts of resources and time might not 
translate into the development of a drug that will gain regulatory approval and be sold on 
the market. 
49. See POLICY CURES RESEARCH., NEGLECTED DISEASE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: A PIVOTAL 
MOMENT FOR GLOBAL HEALTH 5 (2016), http://www.policycuresresearch.org/ downloads/ 
Y9%20GFINDER%20full%20report%20web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WW6-DMLJ]. 
50. Id. at 4. 
51. The Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) is a nonprofit public-private partnership solely 
focused on malaria R&D.  About MMV, MEDS. FOR MALARIA VENTURE, https://www.mmv.org/ 
about-us/about-mmv [https://perma.cc/W38R-R8NJ].  The posterchild for public-private 
partnerships is Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, a Gates-funded vaccine partnership; due to Gates’s 
financial support, Gavi’s funding is unusually high when compared to other players in the same 
field.  See also Robert G. Ridley, Product R&D for Neglected Diseases, 4 EMBO REPS. S43 (2003). 
(surveying the role of the WHO/Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical 
Diseases (WHO/TDR) in supporting product research and development through public–
private partnerships over the span of nearly three decades). 
52. The Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi) is a nonprofit dedicated to R&D in 
underfunded diseases.  About Us, DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, 
https://www.dndi.org/about-dndi [https://perma.cc/G6L3-6KSS]; see infra note 367 and 
accompanying text. 
53. See Richard T. Mahoney, Product Development Partnerships: Case Studies of a New 
Mechanism for Health Technology Innovation, 9 HEALTH RES. POL’Y & SYS. 1, 2 (2011) 
(describing the emergence of the so-called “era of partnerships” in health technology 
innovation). 
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funding remains a major constraint.54  According to data from Policy Cures 
Research, in 2015 global investment on neglected-disease R&D totaled U.S. $3 
billion, a number in steady decline since 2012.55  Of this amount, 71 percent 
(U.S. $2.15 billion) was directed toward R&D on top-tier diseases.56  These 
numbers illustrate how marginal the funding for outbreak and other neglected 
diseases remains. 
In addition to insufficient funding, most of these players face a range of 
other problems, such as the lack of support from coordinating institutions in 
the global health arena (including the WHO), insertion into siloed networks, 
lack of experience in partnering with private-sector entities, and, in some 
cases, lack of experience in navigating national and international political 
economies.57 
Moreover, smaller players—most saliently nonprofits, but a significant 
number of public-private partnerships as well—tend to focus on, and are often 
designed around, ad hoc projects that favor R&D on specific types of 
pathogens.  While focused on neglected diseases, these organizations are more 
likely to work with mainstream diseases on which there is a preexisting and 
somewhat robust chain of R&D.58  Take the case of the Medicines for Malaria 
Venture, a relatively well-funded public-private partnership that engages in the 
discovery, development, and delivery of affordable antimalarial drugs.59  
Among underfunded diseases, malaria R&D falls into the category of sustained 
R&D: the U.S. government has been funding malaria R&D since the WWII 
  
54. See POLICY CURES RESEARCH, supra note 49.  In recent years, shrinking public-sector 
funding for neglected-disease R&D became a major concern. 
55. Id. at 4.  Data also show that the drop in overall funding is largely attributable to a decline 
in public-sector R&D funding. 
56. Predictably, funding for Ebola R&D skyrocketed after 2014 and 2015, totaling $574 
million.  Id. at 6. 
57. See Denise Roland, Experts Criticize World Health Organization’s ‘Slow’ Ebola Outbreak 
Response, WALL STREET J. (May 12, 2015, 12:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/experts-
criticize-world-health-organizations-slow-ebola-outbreak-response-1431344306.  Additional 
problems arise into the outbreak stages, with several well-established institutions often having 
flawed policies in place to cope with the spread of the disease.  See, e.g., Robert Gatter, Ebola, 
Quarantine, and Flawed CDC Policy, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 375, 375 (2015) (noting that 
institutions like the Centers for Disease Control and Protection in the United States have 
interim guidance that “disregards the science of Ebola transmission”). 
58. A notable exception is Gavi, working in areas that range from R&D on Yellow Fever (a 
neglected outbreak disease) to Human Papillomavirus (HPV).  Gavi, as pointed out above, 
remains however an isolated case.  See Vaccine Support, GAVI: THE VACCINE ALLIANCE, 
http://www.gavi.org/support/nvs [https://perma.cc/2FZ2-LMF5]. 
59. MEDS. FOR MALARIA VENTURE, supra note 51.  
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era;60 the Food and Drug Administration has approved two antimalarial 
drugs;61 and in 2016, PATH62 (another Gates-funded, international nonprofit) 
and pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline, reported the successful 
development of the first malaria vaccine (RTS,S).63  As this example illustrates, 
smaller players tend to orbit areas where basic research has already been done 
or is currently underway, and a significant component of their work is to ensure 
affordability of existing or emerging technologies.64 
At least until now, outbreak diseases like Ebola and especially Zika have 
been in R&D limbo.  They have failed to attract substantial private-sector, 
public, and public-private attention.65  The economic footprint of the regions 
where outbreaks occurred in the past have been too small to trigger strong 
private-sector R&D investment, while interest from other players has been 
overshadowed by more visible neglected diseases like malaria or HIV/AIDS.66  
Beyond the cases of Ebola and Zika, outbreak diseases in general do not fit well 
into any R&D mold.  The unpredictability of outbreaks makes investment in a 
specific disease especially risky, as the pathogen may lie dormant for variable 
periods of time.67  And in many cases, lack of knowledge about certain 
pathogens may lead scientists (and consequently, funders) to underestimate the 
  
60. See Paul M. Arguin & Alan J. Magill, For the Record: A History of Malaria Chemoprophylaxis, 
CDC (June 12, 2017), http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/yellowbook/2016/infectious-diseases-
related-to-travel/for-the-record-a-history-of-malaria-chemoprophylaxis [https://perma.cc/ 
657C-GNDS] (last updated June 12, 2017). 
61. Lariam and Malarone.  Id. 
62. PATH, http://www.path.org [https://perma.cc/L5L8-JXZC]. 
63. RTS,S Clinical Trials P’ship, First Results of Phase 3 Trial of RTS,S/AS01 Malaria Vaccine 
in African Children, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1863, 1863 (2011); RTS,S Clinical Trials P’ship, 
Efficacy and Safety of RTS,S/AS01 Malaria Vaccine With or Without a Booster Dose in 
Infants and Children in Africa: Final Results of a Phase 3, Individually Randomised, 
Controlled Trial, 386 LANCET 31, 31 (2015).  See also David C. Kaslow & Sophie Biernaux, 
RTS,S: Toward a First Landmark on the Malaria Vaccine Technology Roadmap, 33 
VACCINE 7425, 7425 (2015). 
64. See infra Subpart II.C.  See also Annette Choi, First Malaria Vaccine, 30 Years in the Making, 
To Be Trialled in Africa, PBS (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/body/ 
first-malaria-vaccine-30-years-in-the-making-to-be-trialed-in-africa. 
65. Infra Subpart I.C.1.a. 
66. See Marco Vitoria et al., The Global Fight Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: 
Current Status and Future Perspectives, 131 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 844 (2009) 
(identifying malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis as “the 3 major global public health 
threats”). 
67. This has happened several times in the chronology of Ebola outbreaks.  See Outbreaks 
Chronology: Ebola Virus Disease, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/history/ 
chronology.html [https://perma.cc/V4F2-N3F5] (last updated July 28, 2017) (listing the 
different strains of Ebola that have caused known outbreaks since 1976). 
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potential damage that a pathogen may cause, as was the case with the recent 
Zika outbreak.68 
Finally, from an incentives perspective, outbreak diseases present one 
more challenge.  As illustrated in the case studies on Ebola and Zika below, 
incentives for R&D on this type of disease peak during the early stages of an 
outbreak.  But the R&D triggered by an outbreak will at best result in vaccines 
and therapies that will target the next (unpredictable) outbreak.  There is 
therefore an intrinsic misalignment between outbreak-induced incentives and 
the product of the corresponding R&D.  As described below, any resulting 
diagnostics, prophylactics, or therapies may become less efficient (or even 
useless) if the pathogen mutates considerably during the inter-outbreak period. 
Considered together, these factors render R&D on pathogens associated 
with outbreak diseases particularly risky and costly.69  Although imposing great 
burdens on health systems across the globe, outbreak diseases attract low levels 
of pre-outbreak R&D,70 a phenomenon that has led the World Health 
Organization to talk about a “lack of R&D preparedness”71 in this area, as 
opposed to suboptimal R&D incentives tout court.  The expression emphasizes 
how R&D for these diseases tends to occur at a particularly depleted level of the 
suboptimal spectrum, at least until an outbreak occurs. 
As described in the following Part, the default system to spur innovation 
in costly areas, or in areas characterized by a heightened risk of failure, relies on 
IP incentives.  Nevertheless, as far as outbreak diseases are concerned, IP 
routinely fails to achieve this goal.72  Furthermore, as Part II shows, existing 
IP might function as a deterrent to expedited R&D when incentives peak 
during the early stages of an outbreak.73  Similarly, IP emerging from outbreak-
induced R&D might function as a barrier to widespread availability and 
affordability of drugs and therapies, an issue to which I return in Part III. 
It is possible that, in the long run, incentives for R&D on outbreak diseases 
will grow as tourism routes broaden and fear of a pandemic becomes more 
global, creating new markets from both a geographic and an economic point of 
view.74  There was a period during the recent Ebola and Zika outbreaks in which 
speculation over a possible catastrophic impact of both diseases in the United 
  
68. See infra Subpart I.C.1.b. 
69. R&D Blueprint, supra note 7, at 18. 
70. Id. at 5. 
71. Id. at 6. 
72. Infra Subpart I.B. 
73. Infra Subpart II.B.  
74. See Belluz, supra note 5. 
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States was in vogue.75  But a significant change in incentives and funding 
models for outbreak diseases is unlikely to take place for decades, which makes 
the need to address both the current lack of pre-outbreak incentives and IP-
related inefficiencies more pressing.76 
B. IP as Incentives: The Problem of Underfunded Diseases 
The previous Part outlined the shortcomings of R&D on diseases with 
complex profiles and limited patient populations.  This Part turns to the role of 
IP—specifically, the patent system—in incentivizing R&D for this type of 
disease. 
Patents have long been regarded as the default mechanism to incentivize 
R&D in areas with imperfect incentives.77  The patent bargain establishes that, 
in exchange for the disclosure of information, the state grants the patentee a set 
of exclusive rights for a certain period of time, currently set at twenty years.78  
This is a market-based approach to spurring innovation in underfunded 
technical and scientific fields79: Absent some form of incentive, would-be 
innovators are likely to shy away from or underinvest in R&D for two reasons.  
First, there are the costs and risks inherent to the R&D process, which can be 
particularly daunting in complex or specialized areas.  And second, without IP 
rights, an invention that was costly and time-consuming to develop tended 
to be disproportionally easy to replicate,80 allowing second-comers to 
  
75. See, e.g., Tara C. Smith, America’s Ebola Panic, SLATE (Oct. 6, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2015/10/ebola_panic_an
niversary_predictions_of_a_u_s_epidemic_didn_t_come_true.html [https://perma.cc/8DTC-
QRMH] (summarizing predictions made in 2014 about the scope of the Ebola outbreak and its 
impact on U.S. soil). 
76. See infra Part III. 
77. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (1962) (examining 
cost efficiency in the use of monopolies to incentivize innovation).  Other approaches to 
patents emphasize efficiency arguments.  See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and 
Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 
1727–28 (2000).  See generally Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation in Economic History, 8 
ANN. REV. ECON. 241 (2016). 
78. The U.S. Constitution adopts an instrumental view of patent rights, which are granted for 
limited periods of time “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
79. See generally Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1017–20 (2014) (noting that the “primary benefit of the intellectual 
property system has always been viewed as its ability to offer a market-based incentive for 
innovation tied to consumers’ willingness to pay”). 
80. There are, of course, exceptions, including macromolecular drugs such as vaccines and 
other biologics, which are difficult to replicate.  See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, 
Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 
1214 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200 (2018) 
	
compete with the innovator by incurring only the marginal cost of 
copying.81 
In theory, the prospect of obtaining a patent lessens the burden associated 
with costly and risky R&D in two ways.  On the one hand, this cost reflects the 
economic investment in producing scientific or technical knowledge, 
developing an innovative product, and, when necessary, obtaining regulatory 
approval to market the invention.82  On the other hand, it also factors in the risk 
associated with the R&D endeavor, as R&D successes (the revenue generated by 
an innovator’s patent portfolio) are expected to absorb the cost of R&D 
failures.83  In this sense, patent exclusivity functions as a carrot given to innova-
tors as a means to encourage the production of socially valuable inventions.84 
Several scholars have likened the twenty-year patent exclusivity to a 
monopoly,85 a traditionally disfavored figure in both economic and 
noneconomic literature.86  Patent-based exclusivity may also be supplemented 
by other features that further enhance the economic reward of the invention, 
like regulatory market exclusivities (such as those arising from the approval of 
certain types of drugs by the Food and Drug Administration),87 data 
  
1026 (2016) (describing the difference between small-molecule drugs and biologics) (“In 
terms of size and rough complexity, if an aspirin were a bicycle, a small biologic would be a 
Toyota Prius, and a large biologic would be an F-16 fighter jet.”). 
81. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30 (1991) (noting that patent applicants often seek to obtain 
broad patents in order to shield their inventions from as much competition as possible). 
82. For an overview of the drug approval process, see Erika F. Lietzan, The Drug Innovation 
Paradox 8–17 (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
2017-12), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2948604 [https://perma.cc/VG92-PWF6]. 
83. That is, products that generate considerable R&D expenditures but that never make it to 
market. 
84. See Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: An Economic 
Model of Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547, 558–65 (2008) (noting that 
patents should incentivize socially optimal levels of innovation, not only via the patent 
carrot but also through use of the nonobviousness threshold stick mechanism).  
85. E.g., Roin, supra note 79, at 1001. 
86. See generally THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, SPEECHES OF LORD MACAULAY: CORRECTED 
BY HIMSELF 112 (1877) (“[T]he effect of monopoly generally is to make articles scarce, to 
make them dear, and to make them bad.”); SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, 
NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (1988). 
87. For instance, six months of market exclusivity may be granted to drugs treating certain 
pediatric diseases, five years to new chemical entities and seven years to orphan drugs (drugs 
treating a disease that affects “fewer than 200,000 people in the U.S., or that affect more than 
200,000 persons but are not expected to recover the costs of developing and marketing a 
treatment drug”).  Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/ucm200552
5.htm [https://perma.cc/A2AP-AN2U] (last updated Feb. 23, 2018); How Can I Better 
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exclusivity,88 or post-patent brand prestige derived from a product that entered 
the market first.89 
Even in a scenario where the patent bargain is successful and the prospect 
of patent exclusivity leads to the production of an innovation, detrimental 
effects are still likely to occur.  When a patent holder is allowed to 
commercialize the invention at heightened prices for twenty years, deadweight 
loss—in the form of would-be consumers that value the invention above 
marginal cost but cannot afford it—is probable.90  This leads to a reduction in 
social welfare that is undesirable but arguably tolerable, if the social benefit 
expected from the invention outweighs the cost of deadweight loss.91 
A successful patent bargain comes therefore at a cost, although one that 
society is in theory willing to accept in exchange for the promotion of 
scientific knowledge and welfare-maximizing innovation.92  However, patents 
as incentive mechanisms may fail in two different forms.  Even when leading 
to the production of innovation, exclusivity arising from a patent may be ill-
calibrated and reward the inventor beyond socially acceptable levels of 
deadweight loss.93  In this case, patents over-reward innovation.  But the 
patent bargain may collapse altogether at an earlier stage, by failing to 
encourage sufficient innovative R&D to begin with.  If the patent exclusivity is 
not calibrated in a way that aligns expected returns with R&D costs and risk, 
then IP does not truly operate as a system of incentives.  In this scenario, even 
  
Understand Patents and Exclusivity?, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/FDABasics 
forIndustry/ucm238582.htm [https://perma.cc/4LXM-AX7Z] (last updated May 22, 2016). 
88. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 359–61 (2007) (discussing the role of FDA regulation in 
biopharmaceutical innovation). 
89. Frederic Sherer, First Mover Advantages and Optimal Patent Protection, The Journal of 
Technology Transfer, 2015, vol. 40, issue 4, 559–80. 
90. Roin, supra note 79, at 1023; Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus 
Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 529 (2001).  But see Robert P. Merges & 
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 
843–44 (1990) (discussing how a patent-based incentives system should still attempt to 
foster competition on the margins). 
91. See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 90, at 529–30 (noting the loss of social welfare 
caused by lack of competition during the period of patent exclusivity). 
92. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
93. For instance, in the field of pharmaceutical R&D, the pharmaceutical industry has 
traditionally pushed for levels of strong patent protection that are often at odds with 
welfare-maximization goals.  See Eisenberg, supra note 88, at 346–47 (describing the role 
of big pharma in perpetuating the myth of a strong patent-based system as a sine qua non 
of drug R&D). 
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when the IP reward is available, the innovator deems it too small to offset the 
cost and risk associated with R&D.94 
Historically, one of the areas in which the patent bargain has been 
especially inept at spurring appropriate levels of innovation is the 
biopharmaceutical arena.95  Biopharmaceutical R&D is especially resource-
intensive, consuming outstanding amounts of money and time.  It is also an 
area where several fields are still in the early stages of development and where 
basic complex research is needed on multiple fronts.  For instance, ongoing 
R&D characterized by informational complexity (for example, cancer96 or 
antimicrobial resistance97) or opacity (for example, algorithm-based precision 
medicine)98 presents especially salient challenges. 
To counteract the insufficiencies of patent-based levers in stimulating 
biopharmaceutical innovation, scholars and policymakers have increasingly 
turned their attention to non-IP forms of incentives,99 such as grants,100 
prizes,101 and R&D tax credits.102  Recent examples of efforts to increase both 
funding and new approaches to problem-solving in biopharmaceutical R&D 
include the creation of the Cancer Moonshot,103 the Precision Medicine 
  
94. There are alternative systems of rewards available to innovators.  See generally Daniel J. 
Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 
(2013) (analyzing prizes, patents, government grants and tax incentives). 
95. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998). 
96. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Cancer’s IP, 96 N.C. L. REV. 297, 297 (2018). 
97. See generally Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Improving Antibiotic Markets for 
Long Term Sustainability, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 101 (2011) (describing 
different types of challenges posed by multidrug resistant bacteria); Kevin Outterson, The 
Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613 (2010) (framing antibiotic resistance as a process of depletion of a 
common good); Kevin Outterson et al., Will Longer Antimicrobial Patents Improve Global 
Public Health?, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 559 (2007) (arguing against the creation of 
new IP rights as a way to incentivize R&D on antimicrobial resistance). 
98. See e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 421–22 
(2015); see also The Precision Medicine Initiative, WHITE HOUSE, http://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/node/333101 [https://perma.cc/H7QW-E4YD]. 
99. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 29. 
100. See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 90, at 525–31. 
101. Roin, supra note 79. 
102. Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 94. 
103. Cancer Moonshot, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/research/key-initiatives/ 
moonshot-cancer-initiative [https://perma.cc/8N9Y-3QC4]; see also Joe Biden, Inspiring a New 
Generation to Defy the Bounds of Innovation: A Moonshot to Cure Cancer, CANCER MOONSHOT 
(Jan. 12, 2016), http://medium.com/cancer-moonshot/inspiring-a-new-generation-to-defy-
the-bounds-of-innovation-a-moonshot-to-cure-cancer-fbdf71d01c2e [https://perma.cc/ 
F3MA-EJQA].  But see Vinay Prasad, Why a Cancer ‘Moonshot’ Is Unlikely to Find Us a Cure, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-a-cancer-
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Initiative (including the All of Us Research Program),104 and the Combating 
Antibiotic Resistant Bacteria Biopharmaceutical Accelerator (Carb-X), a 
public-private partnership aimed at expediting the preclinical development of 
new antibiotics and antimicrobial vaccines and diagnostics.105  These initiatives, 
however, are outliers in an era in which funding streams have consistently 
shrunk.106 
While incentives for biopharmaceutical R&D in general tend to be 
suboptimal, incentives for outbreak-disease R&D in particular are especially 
scarce.  As seen above, there are several factors that make R&D on this group 
of diseases highly risky: strain-specificity, possible genomic mutation 
between outbreaks, lack of basic research, the impossibility of determining 
when the following outbreak will occur, and unpredictability as to the size of 
the following outbreak and the corresponding market for certain types of 
drugs.  Outbreak diseases as a whole are therefore prone to a first type of 
inefficiency: The amount of IP-based incentives available to would-be 
innovators falls substantially below the cost-risk threshold. 
Public-sector funding, which plays a preponderant role in stimulating 
R&D in this area,107 is becoming increasingly thinner.  In the United States, 
which funds nearly three-quarters (72 percent) of global public R&D on 
neglected diseases,108 federal funding for basic research has recently reached a 
post-WWII low,109 a situation that is unlikely to change in the near future.110 
For some outbreak diseases, R&D is bolstered to a certain extent by 
collaborative models that minimize—although they do not eradicate—the 
shortcomings of IP-based incentives.  This is the case of pathogen-specific 
partnerships like the ones surveyed in the previous Part, which add some 
  
moonshot-is-unlikely-to-find-us-a-cure/2016/01/29/08cc66dc-c545-11e5-8965-
0607e0e265ce_story.html [https://perma.cc/DUD9-J8CM] (addressing funding and scientific 
shortcomings of the Cancer Moonshot). 
104. About the All of Us Research Program, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://allofus.nih.gov/about/ 
about-all-us-research-program [https://perma.cc/JJ86-3NRR].  
105. About CARB-X, CARB-X, http://www.carb-x.org/about [https://perma.cc/9EPB-TH27]; 
Sara Rimer, Law School Guides Global Effort to Create New Antibiotics, B.U. TODAY (July 
28, 2016), http://www.bu.edu/today/2016/carb-x [https://perma.cc/XU9Q-PH8J]. 
106. See Jeffrey Mervis, Data Check: Federal Share of Basic Research Hits New Low, 355 SCIENCE 
1005, 1005 (2017). 
107. Id. 
108. POLICY CURES RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 5. 
109. Mervis, supra note 106. 
110. See Ingrid T. Katz & Alexi A. Wright, Scientific Drought, Golden Eggs, and Global 
Leadership—Why Trump’s NIH Funding Cuts Would Be a Disaster, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1701, 1703–04 (2017) (noting recent cuts to the budget of the National Institutes of Health 
and their potential long-lasting impact). 
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muscle to pre- and inter-outbreak R&D for certain diseases (for example, 
malaria).111  Nevertheless, their funding volume and funding streams pale when 
compared to those available to non-outbreak diseases.112 
Conversely, other types of outbreak diseases lack virtually any support, be 
it in the form of IP incentives, non-IP rewards, or partnership models.  This was 
the case of Zika between 1947, when it was first discovered, and the start of the 
2015–16 outbreak.113 
Even when an outbreak triggers investment in an otherwise underfunded 
disease, R&D may still remain at low levels.  Consider the case of Ebola 
vaccines, for which incentives spiked at the beginning of the 2014–16 
outbreak.114  Even though there had been multiple Ebola outbreaks in the past 
(with mortality rates of up to 89 percent),115 until 2013 the possibility of 
“properly controlled clinical trials seemed impossible”116 due to low enrollment 
of eligible patients.  Outbreak diseases with low case numbers, high mortality 
rates, or both, have the potential to generate low-quality clinical trial data that 
may not benefit follow-on innovation. 
In the following Part, I turn to the specificities of the pre-Ebola and pre-
Zika R&D landscapes, both of which reflect IP inefficiencies in the form of 
low levels of pre-outbreak incentives to R&D.  Part III, while addressing 
issues related to post-outbreak IP generated by R&D on Zika vaccines, 
illustrates yet another type of IP inefficiency identified above: over-rewarding 
of a vaccine innovator and its potential impact on social welfare. 
C. Evidence from the 2014–16 Ebola and Zika Outbreaks 
1. Pre-Outbreak R&D 
a. Ebola 
Even though we still lack a fully developed Ebola vaccine, the Ebola virus 
has been known to scientists since 1976.117  Until the 2014–16 outbreak, fatality 
  
111. Supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text. 
112. Id. 
113. Infra Subpart I.C.1.b. 
114. Infra Subpart I.C.2.a. 
115. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 67. 
116. Karen A. Martins et al., Ebola Virus Disease Candidate Vaccines Under Evaluation in 
Clinical Trials, 15 EXPERT REV. VACCINES 1101, 1101 (2016). 
117. This first registered outbreak took place in Sudan and Zaire, collectively infecting around 600 
people.  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 67.  The Sudan outbreak had 
a fatality rate of 53 percent, while the one in Zaire registered the second-highest Ebola fatality 
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rates ranged from 25 percent to close to 90 percent, for an estimated average of 
50 percent.118  These numbers make the Ebola virus frightful from a public 
health perspective and yet unappealing from the R&D and incentives 
perspectives.  While the disease burden has been considerable over the past 
thirty-five years, the intermittent nature of outbreaks, an Ebola-free decade (the 
1980s), and the geography of the outbreaks—affecting non-affluent, mostly 
rural populations in the developing world—consistently kept R&D efforts at 
very low levels.119 
While manifestly insufficient, R&D was nonetheless somewhat sustained: 
Basic research was conducted in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries by the public sector, primarily in the United States and Canada.120  By 
the time the extent and burden of the 2014–16 outbreak became apparent and 
funding streams opened up, enough Ebola-related research had been 
conducted to support expedited R&D of multiple vaccines and therapies.121 
Part of the public-sector interest in funding Ebola R&D was tied to 
concerns of bioterrorism, especially in the wake of 9/11.122  In 2006, the 
Department of Homeland Security declared that Ebola “presented a material 
threat to the U.S. population sufficient to affect national security.”123  The virus 
  
rate in history, at 89 percent.  Id.  For over a decade after 1979, there were no reported cases of 
Ebola (this includes four of the five known strains of Ebola; excluded is Ebola-Reston, which 
is asymptomatic in humans).  Id.  The outbreaks resumed in 1994, but between then and the 
2014–16 outbreak, there were never more than 425 cases in any year.  Id. 
118. Case numbers per outbreak have also varied widely.  For instance, in 2000–01 there was an 
Ebola outbreak (Sudan virus) in Uganda, with 425 reported cases and 224 deaths, for a 53 
percent mortality rate.  By contrast, in 2004 there was an outbreak in Sudan (now South 
Sudan) of the same strain of Ebola with much lower numbers: 17 cases and 7 deaths (41 
percent mortality rate).  Id. 
119. See generally POLICY CURES RESEARCH, supra note 49. 
120. See William W. Fisher III & Katrina Geddes, Learning From Ebola: How Drug-Development 
Policy Could Help Stop Outbreaks of Infectious Diseases 28 (Oct. 14, 2015), https://cyber. 
harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Learning_from_Ebola.pdf [https://perma.cc/NH7Z-NQ3E].  See 
NIH, Ebola Vaccines, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/ebola-vaccines (detailing 
the participation of the US government in Ebola vaccine R&D). 
121. Fisher & Geddes, supra note 120, at 28, 38 (listing the different partnerships formed to 
develop Ebola vaccines and therapies shortly after the beginning of the 2014 outbreak). 
122. Before 9/11, there were already concerns surrounding the potential use of the Ebola virus in a 
bioterrorism attack, but these concerns were largely assuaged by the fact that it is extremely 
difficult to access samples of infectious diseases like Ebola.  Although there have been episodic 
attempts—like the one perpetrated by Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo, which tried 
(and failed) to obtain Ebola cultures—gathering samples for bioterrorism purposes remains 
notoriously difficult.  See Dina Fine Maron, Weaponized Ebola: Is It Really a Bioterror Threat?, 
SCI. AM. (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/weaponized-ebola-is-it-
really-a-bioterror-threat [https://perma.cc/VU7U-H7QU]. 
123. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2015 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY MEDICAL 
COUNTERMEASURES ENTERPRISE (PHEMCE) STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 15 
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was added to the Department of Health and Human Services’s high-priority 
threat list, where it remains.124  The linkage between Ebola and bioterrorism 
also co-involved institutional players that do not necessarily invest in R&D for 
other types of outbreak diseases, such as the Department of Defense and the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA).125 
The effect of linking Ebola to national security concerns thus tempered 
the generalized lack of R&D incentives, although paradoxically the costs of 
engaging in Ebola R&D remain higher than for more severely underfunded 
outbreak diseases, like Zika.  This is due to the fact that Ebola R&D must be 
performed in facilities conforming to the most stringent type of biosafety 
requirements (biosafety level 4, or BSL-4).126  Creating and maintaining BSL-4 
facilities is expensive, with initial building costs estimated at around U.S. $350 
million.127  These costs are supported by the public sector, which until the 
2014–16 outbreak was virtually the sole funder of Ebola R&D.128 
Pre-outbreak incentives for Ebola were low, but sustained.  Private-sector 
interest, however, was almost nonexistent.  A chronology of the pre-outbreak 
development of what was deemed to be a promising Ebola vaccine illustrates 
this trend.  In the early 2000s, the Canadian government funded R&D at the 
National Microbiology Laboratory129 on experimental vaccines targeting the 
Ebola virus (EBOV) and Marburg virus (MARV).130  The Ebola vaccine was 
  
(2015), https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/mcm/phemce/Documents/2015-PHEMCE-
SIP.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2DB-E8SY] [hereinafter PHEMCE]. 
124. See id. 
125. Id. at 16–17. 
126. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, BIOSAFETY IN MICROBIOLOGICAL AND 
BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES 251 (5th ed. 2009), https://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/ 
bmbl5/bmbl.pdf [https://perma.cc/XWZ8-H4L8].  The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention require BSL-4 for “work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high 
individual risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory infections and life-threatening disease that is 
frequently fatal, for which there are no vaccines or treatments, or a related agent with unknown 
risk of transmission.”  Id. at 45. 
127. Helen Branswell, CDC requests funds to build new maximum-security laboratory, STAT 
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/02/23/cdc-bsl4-laboratory/ [https:// 
perma.cc/H5UV-5XCP] (noting that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
requested U.S. $350 million in early 2018 to support the costs of a new building to house 
BSL-4 laboratories). 
128. POLICY CURES RESEARCH , supra note 49, at 93 and accompanying text. 
129. The National Microbiology Laboratory is part of the Public Health Agency of Canada.  See 
National Microbiology Laboratory, PUB. HEALTH AGENCY CAN., https://www.nml-
lnm.gc.ca/index-eng.htm [https://perma.cc/5597-VWPC] (last modified July 31, 2015). 
130. See Stephen M. Jones et al., Live Attenuated Recombinant Vaccine Protects Nonhuman 
Primates Against Ebola and Marburg Viruses, 11 NATURE MED. 786 (2005).  The 
development of the rVSV-EBOV vaccine built itself on preexisting research.  See, e.g., 
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based on an attenuated recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus (rVSV) and 
became known as rVSV-ZEBOV.131 
The Canadian government was granted a patent on rVSV-ZEBOV in 
2003.132  Further R&D for this vaccine was done by scientists in Canada 
between 2003 and 2005, with animal tests being run by the U.S. Army’s Medical 
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).133  The tests run on 
nonhuman primates confirmed the safety of the vaccine candidates and 
showed them to be “highly efficacious.”134  The achievement was hailed as 
groundbreaking.135  Researchers initially hoped to start human clinical trials 
around 2008 and to start licensing the vaccine in 2010 or 2011.136 
By 2011, however, scientists involved in the development of rVSV-
ZEBOV were still making the case that the vaccines should be moved along in 
the R&D pipeline: 
Given the efficacy profile in preventive and treatment approaches 
and the safety record in several immune-competent and immune-
compromised animal species, this vaccine platform is ready to be 
considered for investigational drug licensure.  We further propose 
to consider the rVSV platform for preinvestigational drug use in 
cases of laboratory exposures with EBOV . . . .137 
In spite of promising preclinical results, private-sector interest in licensing 
the vaccines was virtually nonexistent.138  The pace of R&D on rVSV-ZEBOV 
slowed considerably.  Eventually the vaccine was licensed to NewLink Genetics, 
  
Anjeanette Roberts et al., Attenuated Vesicular Stomatitis Viruses As Vaccine Vectors, 73 J. 
VIROLOGY 3723 (1999). 
131. See Andrea Marzi et al., Vesicular Stomatitis Virus-Based Ebola Vaccines With Improved 
Cross-Protective Efficacy, 204 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1066 (2011). 
132. Recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus Vaccines for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, Can. 
Patent No. WO 2004/011488 A2 (filed July 28, 2003). 
133. USAMRIID is the “lead laboratory for medical biological defense research” for the 
Department of Defense.  See About USAMRIID, U.S. ARMY MED. RES. INST. INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES, http://www.usamriid.army.mil/aboutpage.htm [https://perma.cc/8YBW-WUY8] 
(last modified Dec. 4, 2016). 
134. Jones et al., supra note 130. 
135. See Richard Knox, Scientists Race to Find Vaccine for Ebola, Marbug, NPR (June 6, 2005, 
12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4681932. 
136. See Denise Grady, Ebola Vaccine, Ready for Test, Sat on the Shelf, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/health/without-lucrative-market-potential-
ebola-vaccine-was-shelved-for-years.html.  
137. See Thomas W. Geisbert & Heinz Feldmann, Recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus-
Based Vaccines Against Ebola and Marburg Virus Infections, 204 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
1075, 1079 (2011). 
138. See Dan Lett, Wanted: Manufacturer for Ebola and Marburg Vaccines, 173 CAN. MED. 
ASS’N J. 472 (2005); Grady, supra note 136. 
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a small Iowa-based pharmaceutical company.139  The agreement reached with 
the Canadian government granted NewLink a “sole, worldwide, revocable and 
royalty-bearing license.”140  The license required NewLink to commercialize the 
vaccine “for . . . maximum commercial return.”141  NewLink, however, did not 
prioritize Ebola R&D, and rVSV-ZEBOV was not moved to clinical trials.  As 
one commentator put it, “the vaccine sat on a shelf” for years.142  It would take 
the violent outbreak of 2014–16 for interest in the rVSV-ZEBOV line of R&D 
to rekindle, as described in Part II. 
The pre-outbreak R&D landscape for Ebola was thus characterized by 
sustained yet low public-sector incentives, as well as by virtually nonexistent 
incentives in the private sector.  This asymmetry negatively impacted the pace 
of Ebola R&D, as the private sector remains the main driver behind clinical 
drug development.143  When a catalyst event—the 2014–16 outbreak—sparked 
the need for Ebola vaccines and therapies, there was a wide market failure.  No 
approved vaccine or treatment for the disease existed.144  Experimental 
medicines were also in short supply.145  Even today, during the inter-outbreak 
period following the largest and most lethal Ebola pandemic in recorded 
history, it is not clear that the vaccines currently in advanced clinical 
development will have a “clear commercial market.”146 
b. Zika 
The discovery of Zika, dating back to 1947 in Uganda, predates that of 
Ebola.147  Before the 2015–16 outbreak, the only known symptoms associated 
  
139. NEWLINK GENETICS, http://www.newlinkgenetics.com [https://perma.cc/V8GT-46JW]. 
140. Sole Licensing Agreement for Recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus Vaccines for Viral 
Hemorrhagic Fevers, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/ 
infectious-diseases/viral-haemorrhagic-fevers/sole-license-agreement-recombinant-vesicular-
stomatitis-virus-vaccines-viral-hemorrhagic-fevers.html [https://perma.cc/A7VJ-AA7U] (last 
modified Oct. 13, 2014).  NewLink was, at the time, a subsidiary of BioProtection Corp. 
141. Id.  The full provision required NewLink to work the patent for full profit of “the Company 
and Canada.” 
142. Grady, supra note 136. 
143. Once the outbreak began, the private sector did enter the Ebola vaccine race.  Infra Part II. 
144. See Statement on the WHO Consultation on Potential Ebola Therapies and Vaccines, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ statements/2014/ebola-
therapies-consultation/en [https://perma.cc/F8JW-AX6C]. 
145. Id. 
146. CIDRAP, supra note 9, at 25. 
147. See Oumar Faye et al., Molecular Evolution of Zika Virus During Its Emergence in the 20th 
Century, 8 PLOS NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES 1 (2014); A. J. Haddow et al., Twelve Isolations 
of Zika Virus From Aedes (Stegomyia) Africanus (Theobald) Taken in and Above a Uganda 
Forest, 31 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 57 (1964).  A year after the Ugandan outbreak, scientists 
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with Zika were considered mild: cutaneous rash, malaise, fever, and 
headache.148  Given the similarities between these and the symptoms triggered 
by influenza, it is probable that Zika outbreaks went largely undetected through 
history.149  At the turn of the century, there were only fourteen documented 
cases of Zika infection in humans worldwide.150  That number more than 
tripled in 2007 during an outbreak on a small Micronesian island.  There were 
forty-nine confirmed cases, and it is estimated that nearly three quarters (74 
percent) of the island’s residents over the age of three had been infected by the 
virus at some point.151 
Research concluded in 2012 showed that there were now two different 
lineages of Zika virus, African and Asian.152  A 2013–14 outbreak in the South 
Pacific, caused by a virus belonging to the Asian lineage, raised the first suspicions 
that Zika infection could be connected to Guillain-Barré syndrome, a rare 
neurological disorder.153  That hypothesis remained unconfirmed until the 2015–
16 outbreak in Latin America, but it has now been established that the virus that 
emerged during the South Pacific outbreak is likely to be the same or related to 
the one that caused the 2015–16 outbreak in Brazil.154 
  
succeeded in isolating the virus from Aedes africanus mosquitos and, in 1952, the first cases of 
Zika infections in humans were reported in Uganda and Tanzania.  See The History of Zika 
Virus, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/emergencies/zika-virus/timeline/en 
[https://perma.cc/E2TJ-YGJT].  While most prevalent in Western Africa, Zika expanded 
across the continent during the 1970s and reached Asia by the end of the decade.  See Jon 
Cohen, Zika’s Long, Strange Trip Into the Limelight, SCIENCE (Feb. 8, 2016, 5:45 PM), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/02/zika-s-long-strange-trip-limelight 
[https://perma.cc/QL28-X3CF] (tracing the evolution of Zika R&D). 
148. For an overview of the most common symptoms caused by Zika infection, see Zika Virus, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/zika/en [https://perma. 
cc/5N53-6Y8E] (last updated Sept. 6, 2016); see also Cohen, supra note 147. 
149. Cf. Zika Virus Spread Undetected for Many Months, NIH-Supported Study Finds, NAT’L INST. 
HEALTH (May 24, 2017), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/news-events/zika-virus-spread-undetected-
many-months-nih-supported-study-finds [https://perma.cc/5RBA-Z5TR] (noting that even 
during the recent outbreak in Latin America the virus went undetected for several months). 
150. See Cohen, supra note 147. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. See Van-Mai Cao-Lormeau et al., Guillain-Barré Syndrome Outbreak Associated With Zika 
Virus Infection in French Polynesia: A Case-Control Study, 387 LANCET 1531 (2016). 
154. Research carried out during the 2015–16 outbreak confirmed the linkage between Zika and 
Guillain-Barré syndrome.  See Michael A. Johansson et al., Zika and the Risk of Microcephaly, 
375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 (2016); Thais dos Santos et al., Zika Virus and the Guillain-Barré 
Syndrome—Case Series From Seven Countries, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1598 (2016).  Outbreak-
induced research also discovered connections between Zika and congenital defects.  See 
Fernanda R. Cugola et al., The Brazilian Zika Virus Strain Causes Birth Defects in 
Experimental Models, 534 NATURE 267 (2016) (describing additional Zika complications). 
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Research on Zika thus predates R&D on Ebola, but given the apparent lesser 
severity of Zika infection, allocation of resources toward Zika R&D was 
understandably not a priority until 2015, even by the incentives standards that 
normally apply to outbreak diseases.  R&D efforts were further along in other 
diseases in the Zika family (flavivirus).  For instance, this was true of Japanese 
encephalitis, for which vaccine technology was developed in the United States in 
2009.155  As described in Part II, existence of R&D in the genus to which a virus 
belongs might be helpful in speeding R&D for that virus once an outbreak occurs.  
Due to the profile and burden of the Zika virus throughout the 20th 
century, at the time of the 2015–16 outbreak the market failure for Zika was 
quantitatively and qualitatively different from the one observed with Ebola.  
Incentives to R&D were low and intermittent, resulting in the complete lack of 
R&D efforts aimed at generating a vaccine or treatment for Zika infection in 
humans.156  The incentives landscape changed in 2015 with the outbreak in 
Latin America, much in the same way it did for Ebola with the West Africa 
outbreak in 2014. 
2. Impact of the 2014–16 Outbreaks on Incentives and R&D Frameworks 
a. The Ebola Vaccine Race 
The large-scale outbreaks of 2014–16 had a profound impact on the R&D 
landscape, with different players coming together exceptionally quickly to 
support the development of vaccines for the outbreak diseases. 
In the case of Ebola, this was “the largest and most complex” outbreak ever 
recorded.157  There were more reported cases and deaths during this period 
than in all the previous outbreaks combined.158  The WHO declared it a Public 
  
155. Testing of Investigational Inactivated Zika Vaccine in Humans Begins, NAT’L INST. HEALTH 
(Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/testing-investigational-
inactivated-zika-vaccine-humans-begins [https://perma.cc/7SJZ-P5PY]. 
156. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., R&D BLUEPRINT, supra note 7.  See also WORLD HEALTH ORG, 
WHO/UNICEF Zika Virus (ZIKV) Vaccine Target Product Profile (TPP): Vaccine to protect 
against congenital Zika syndrome for useduring (sic) an emergency, http://www.who.int/ 
immunization/research/development/Zika_vaccine_TPP_QandA_feb17.pdf?ua=1 (detailing 
the timeline of the product profile for Zika vaccines). 
157. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 41. 
158. The outbreak originated in a village in Guinea, and patient zero has been traced back to 
late 2013.  The disease expanded quickly, and by March 2014 the Ministry of Health of 
Guinea confirmed an outbreak of Ebola virus disease, reporting 49 cases and 29 deaths (a 
mortality rate of 59 percent).  See Ebola Viral Disease Outbreak—West Africa, 2014, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 27, 2014), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
preview/mmwrhtml/mm6325a4.htm [https://perma.cc/54TX-99GR].  Between late March and 
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Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on August 8, 2014.159  By 
this point, there were 1711 reported cases and 932 deaths.160 
PHEIC status for Ebola lasted until March 29, 2016.161  By the time it was 
lifted, there had been 28,610 reported cases and over 11,000 deaths in three 
countries.162  As of late-2016, there were over 10,000 Ebola survivors from the 
Western Africa outbreak and subsequent flare-ups.163  The only fatality 
outside West Africa occurred in the United States, where a total of eleven 
patients were treated for Ebola virus disease.164 
Even though R&D sparked by the emergence of a pathogen is of no avail 
to at-risk populations during an ongoing outbreak, the magnitude of the 2014–
16 events in Western Africa—coupled with fear of a worldwide pandemic 
fueled by globalized travel—introduced important changes to the incentives 
landscape for Ebola R&D.  Funding for Ebola R&D increased by 258 percent 
between 2014 and 2015.165  Looking at global investment in African viral 
hemorrhagic fevers166 for 2015, 91 percent (U.S. $574 million) was directed 
  
May 2014, Ebola expanded into Liberia and Sierra Leone, prompting Médecins Sans 
Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) to state that the outbreak was “out of control.”  See 
Ebola: Massive Deployment Needed to Fight Epidemic in West Africa, DOCTORS WITHOUT 
BORDERS (June 23, 2014), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/press- release/ 
ebola-massive-deployment-needed-fight-epidemic-west-africa [https://perma.cc/WG33-
GW7M]. 
159. See Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola Outbreak 
in West Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/ 
news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en [https://perma.cc/TMG9-BEN5].  The WHO has 
the authority to declare a PHEIC under the International Health Regulations, a binding set of 
rules for the WHO Member States.  Article 2 of the regulations defines its “purpose and scope” 
as follows: “to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the 
international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health 
risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.”  WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS 10 (2d ed. 2005) (emphasis added). 
160. Ebola Virus Disease Update—West Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2014_08_06_ebola/en [https://perma.cc/J9UA-DL2M]. 
161. See Helen Branswell, The Ebola Public Health Emergency Is Over, WHO Declares, but 
Concerns Linger, STAT (March 29, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/29/ebola-
who-end-of-emergency [https://perma.cc/ZR62-NLVZ]. 
162. Ebola Data and Statistics, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.ebola-
sitrep.ebola-summary-20160330?lang=en.  
163. Ebola Outbreak 2014–2015, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.who.int/csr/ 
disease/ebola/en [https://perma.cc/942A-LCZG]. 
164. Liberian citizen Thomas Eric Duncan died in Dallas on October 8, 2014.  See Press Briefing 
Transcript, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 8, 2014, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.cdc.gov/ media/releases/2014/t1008-ebola-confirmed-case.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4VU6-2THS]. 
165. See POLICY CURES RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 6. 
166. Id.  This category of diseases includes Ebola and other diseases in the Ebola family, like Marburg.  
It also includes a wide range of other types of diseases, such as Lassa fever, Crimean-Congo 
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toward Ebola R&D.  Of this amount, 61 percent (U.S. $388 million) was used 
to fund vaccine R&D.167  Investment in drug development accounted for 16 
percent (U.S. $103 million); basic research, 9.4 percent (U.S. $59 million); and 
diagnostics, 4.4 percent (U.S. $28 million).168 
While the public sector remained the largest funder of Ebola R&D, the 
role of the private sector increased significantly.  Data referring to overall 
funding for Ebola and other African viral hemorrhagic fevers shows that 
pharmaceutical companies were responsible for 36 percent (U.S. $226 million) 
of R&D expenditures, vis-à-vis 61 percent (U.S. $383 million) coming from the 
public sector.169  Philanthropic contributions were modest at 3.4 percent (U.S. 
$22 million) and product-development partnerships “played little to no role.”170 
The outbreak-induced funding mosaic suggests that, although pandemic 
events may cause a quantitative increase in R&D expenditures, they are unlikely 
to affect the primacy of the public sector in ensuring both reactive R&D and 
long-term R&D.  But the private sector emerges as a powerful force in the late- 
and post-outbreak periods, particularly in the clinical development context.171  
This dynamic was at play during the Ebola vaccine race that began during the 
early stages of the 2014–16 outbreak. 
Before the outbreak, moderately low incentives resulted in a fragmented 
R&D landscape covering different strains of Ebola.  The outbreak sped up 
existing R&D and triggered new R&D at an extraordinary pace.  By 2015, there 
were twenty-one ongoing R&D projects.172  Of these, twelve were vaccines173 
and nine antiviral therapies.174  With nearly two-thirds of R&D175 being 
directed toward vaccine development—and given the pivotal role of vaccines in 
decreasing the public health impact of future outbreaks176—it is worth taking a 
closer look at how the Ebola vaccine race unfolded, as well as at the 
consequences of that race from an IP perspective. 
  
hemorrhagic fever, and Rift Valley fever.  See Haemorrhagic Fevers, Viral, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/topics/haemorrhagic_fevers_viral/en [https://perma.cc/RL7K-XZUR]. 
167. See POLICY CURES RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 89. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 90. 
170. Id. at 93. 
171. See infra Figure 1 (showing both private and public-sector players in the development of 
an Ebola vaccine). 
172. See Fisher & Geddes, supra note 120, at 13. 
173. Id. at 13–28. 
174. Id. at 29–38. 
175. POLICY CURES RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 6. 
176. Røttingen et al., supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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With the sudden spike in incentives to conduct R&D on Ebola, several 
vaccine candidates emerged, displaying pluralistic R&D approaches as shown 
in Table 1.  As of early 2017, there were five types of Ebola vaccine candidates, 
most of them with multiple ongoing projects.177  In addition to different types 
of vaccines, there are emerging studies evaluating the possibility of extending 
R&D for a specific strain of Ebola into other strains.178 












DNA vaccines INO-4201, INO-4202, INO-4212 
Subunit vaccines 
EBOV GP nanoparticle vaccine with 
Matrix-M adjuvant 
Table 1: Ebola Vaccine Candidates (2017)180 
As of mid-2017, seven vaccines have entered clinical trials.  Three of 
them have moved to advanced trials: rVSV-ZEBOV, cAd3-EBOZ and 
Ad26-EBOV/MVA-EBOV.181 
rVSV-ZEBOV is the Canada-developed recombinant vesicular stomatitis 
virus-based vaccine, which was patented in 2003 but subsequently failed to 
  
177. Figure 1 follows the taxonomy used by the Center for Infectious Disease Research and 
Policy at the University of Minnesota in January 2017.  See CIDRAP, supra note 9, at 10.  
Other categorizations are possible; for instance, Keshwara et al. have proposed the 
following breakdown: DNA vaccines; virus-like particles and nanoparticle vaccines; 
replication-deficient Ebola; adenovirus-based vaccines; vesicular stomatitis virus; and 
recombinant rabies virus.  See Rohan Keshwara et al., Toward an Effective Ebola Virus 
Vaccine, 68 ANN. REV. MED. 371 (2017). 
178. See Martins et al., supra note 116. 
179. As of early 2017. 
180. See CIDRAP, supra note 9, at 10. 
181. See Keith J. Chappell & Daniel Watterson, Fighting Ebola: A Window for Vaccine Re-
evaluation?, 13 PLOS PATHOGENS 1 (2017); see also Yuxiao Wang et al., Ebola Vaccines in 
Clinical Trial: The Promising Candidates, 13 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 153 
(2017); Keshwara et al., supra note 177, at 379; Martins et al., supra note 116.  
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attract sufficient private-sector support.182  It quickly became widely considered 
the most advanced of the Ebola vaccine candidates.183  
A few months after the start of the outbreak, this vaccine was pushed 
through the R&D pipeline by NewLink Genetics, now in partnership with a 
large U.S. pharmaceutical company, Merck.184  Funding poured in quickly as 
different types of players joined the network supporting expedited R&D on 
rVSV-ZEBOV.  Figure 1 below provides an overview of this network according 
to the role taken on by each player. 
 
 
Figure 1:  rVSV-ZEBOV Vaccine Candidate 
 
The most noticeable difference brought about by the outbreak-induced 
change in the incentives landscape was the entry of the private sector into 
vaccine R&D.  This occurred not only in the case of the current leading vaccine 
  
182. See supra, note 141. 
183. See Chappell & Watterson, supra note 181. 
184. This was not a smooth transition, however.  See infra Part II. 
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candidate, rVSV-ZEBOV, but with other candidates that emerged during the 
outbreak.185  Small pharmaceutical companies played a role in bringing 
preexisting vaccine technology into expanded collaborative R&D models, while 
big pharma drove follow-on R&D, mostly at the level of clinical development.  
The case of rVSV-ZEBOV illustrates this point, as NewLink had acquired the 
IP rights to the vaccine three years before the outbreak, but it was the 
collaboration with Merck that pushed the vaccine through the R&D pipeline.186 
The breadth of institutions involved in clinical studies and trials is 
consistent with trends observed in other infectious disease outbreaks.187  Both 
Canadian research institutions and the USAMRIID were involved in pre-
outbreak R&D, having participated in preclinical R&D for rVSV-ZEBOV a 
decade before the outbreak.188  The other players listed in Table 1 show a blend 
of international players that is common to vaccine candidates,189 as well as the 
geographical focus of the 2014–16 outbreak (with Guinea and Sierra Leone 
being among the most affected countries). 
Given the status of Ebola as a “material threat” to U.S. national security,190 
it should come as no surprise that two dominant funding players were the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) and the 
U.S. Department of Defense.191  BARDA is part of the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, created after Hurricane Katrina with 
the goal of “preventing, preparing for, and responding to the adverse health 
effects of public health emergencies and disasters.”192  BARDA engages in both 
development and procurement of medical countermeasures193 for chemical, 
  
185. See infra Figure 2, a propos the cAd3-EBOZ vaccine example.  It also occurred in the case 
of non-vaccine R&D, such as for Ebola therapeutic drugs. 
186. See infra Subpart II.B. 
187. See, e.g., Daniel Lucey & Lawrence O. Gostin, A Yellow Fever Epidemic: A New Global 
Health Emergency?, 315 JAMA 2661 (2016) (noting the role of the WHO in the response to 
Yellow Fever outbreaks). 
188. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
189. See infra Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
190. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  
191. See PHEMCE, supra note 123, at 16–17. 
192. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, 
https://www.phe.gov/about/aspr/pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/2FVC-FYG5] [here-
inafter ASPR].  ASPR operates under the umbrella of the Department of Health and Human 
Services.  Id. 
193. Medical countermeasures are drugs used to respond to bioterrorism, naturally occurring 
emerging diseases, or natural disasters.  See What Are Medical Countermeasures?, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/
AboutMCMi/ucm431268.htm [https://perma.cc/5HFW-DTL9 ] (last updated Feb. 5, 2018). 
1230 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200 (2018) 
	
biological, radiological, and nuclear defense.194  From the onset of the outbreak, 
BARDA was involved with different types of Ebola R&D.  Besides funding 
clinical development of rVSV-ZEBOV, BARDA also collaborated with 
companies and institutions developing other vaccine candidates.  For instance, 
in December 2014 it awarded GlaxoSmithKline U.S. $12.9 million for the 
manufacturing of cAd3-EBOZ, a monovalent vaccine derived from a 
recombinant chimpanzee adenovirus.195  In addition to investing in vaccine 
R&D, BARDA collaborated with companies and institutions involved in non-
vaccine R&D.  This was the case with the experimental drug ZMapp, a 
monoclonal antibody cocktail used as a therapeutic agent for acute Ebola virus 
disease.196  BARDA co-funded the clinical development of the drug alongside 
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and the 
Department of Defense (through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency).197  
BARDA entered into an eighteen-month, U.S. $24.9 million contract 
(extendable to U.S. $42.3 million) with Mapp Biopharmaceutical, a small 
company based in Southern California.198  This multipronged approach to 
early-outbreak Ebola R&D was followed by several public-sector institutions, 
especially U.S. government agencies, as Figure 2 below illustrates.199  
The other leading Ebola vaccine candidates, as of early 2017, rely on a 
different type of technology: Both cAd3-EBOZ and Ad26-EBOV/MVA-EBOV 
  
194. This is known as CBRN defense and the U.S. Army is the leading player in the response to 
CBRN crises.  In addition to contributing to CBRN defense through drug development, 
procurement, and stockpiling, BARDA develops and procures drugs for pandemic influenza 
and emerging infectious diseases.  See Biomedical Advanced Research and Development 
Authority (BARDA), MED. COUNTERMEASURES.GOV, https://www.medicalcountermeasures. 
gov/barda.aspx [https://perma.cc/NR8A-VBAW]. 
195. See Figure 2 below, mapping the other players involved in the development of the cAd3-
EBOZ vaccine candidate).  See also Fisher & Geddes, supra note 120, at 18; infra Figure 3. 
196. See G. Marshall Lyon et al., Clinical Care of Two Patients With Ebola Virus Disease in the 
United States, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2402 (2014). 
197. See PHEMCE, supra note 123, at 15–17. 
198. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Contracts With Mapp 
Biopharmaceutical to Develop Ebola Drug (Sept. 2, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20160116072625/http://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2014/09/02/hhs-contracts-with-mapp-
biopharmaceutical-to-develop-ebola-drug.html [https://perma.cc/G856-WP6D].  Clinical trials 
for ZMapp were considered promising but missed the statistical threshold.  See Stephanie 
Soucheray, Trial Offers Mixed View of Ebola Drug ZMapp, CIDRAP (Oct. 12, 2016), 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2016/10/trial-offers-mixed-view-ebola-drug-
zmapp [https://perma.cc/AD56-KC4C] (noting that the drug ZMapp demonstrated efficacy in 
91.2 percent of cases, below the current standard of 97.5 percent). 
199. See infra Figure 2.  Other institutions that played a prominent role in funding multiple 
R&D projects include the Department of Defense and National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID). 
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are adenovirus-based vaccines.200  In the case of cAd3-EBOZ, the initial bulk 
of funding for the expedited development of the vaccine was provided by 
the European Commission and, to a smaller extent, by the Swiss 
government.201  Supplemental funding was provided to the University of 
Oxford and the Jenner Institute by three U.K.-based institutions202: 
Wellcome Trust, the second largest nongovernmental funder of biomedical 
research in the U.K.;203 the Medical Research Council, a government 
agency;204 and the Department for International Development, a ministerial 
department.205  NIAID funded and conducted clinical trials in the U.S.206 
 
  
200. See Vincent Pavot, Leading Ebola Vaccine Candidates, 1 VACCINATION RES. OPEN J. 1 (2016); 
see also Milagritos D. Tapia et al., Use of ChAd3-EBO-Z Ebola Virus Vaccine in Malian and 
US Adults, and Boosting of Malian Adults With MVA-BN-Filo: A Phase 1, Single-Blind, 
Randomised Trial, a Phase 1b, Open-Label and Double-Blind, Dose-Escalation Trial, and a 
Nested, Randomised, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial, 16 LANCET 31 (2015). 
201. The European Commission contributed around $20 million and the Swiss government, 
U.S. $2 million.  Fisher & Geddes, supra note 120, at 18. 
202. U.S. $4.6 million.  Id. at 17. 
203. About Us, WELLCOME TRUST, https://wellcome.ac.uk/about-us [https://perma.cc/44YS-
CKHM]; see also Emma Howard, What Is the Wellcome Trust?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2015, 8:51 
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/16/what-is-the-wellcome-trust 
[https://perma.cc/H5UQ-2UVQ].  See also Emma Howard, What is the Wellcome Trust?, The 
Guardian (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/16/what-is-
the-wellcome-trust. 
204. About Us, MED. RES. COUNCIL, https://www.mrc.ac.uk/about [https://perma.cc/DD56-KLHM]. 
205. DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-
international-development [https://perma.cc/GQ5K-2ZG2]. 
206. Fisher & Geddes, supra note 118, at 17. 
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Figure 2: CAD3-EBOZ VACCINE CANDIDATE 
 
Private-sector R&D was led by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), which had 
bought a small Swiss biotech company (Okairos) the year before the outbreak 
for strategic reasons that did not have much to do with Ebola R&D.207  As it 
happened, Okairos’s portfolio included rights over the then early-stage cAd3-
EBOZ vaccine.208  Unlike Merck and NewLink, which had to negotiate the IP 
  
207. See Ben Hirschler, GSK Bets on Chimp Virus With $321 Million Vaccines Buy, REUTERS (May 
30, 2013, 8:35 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-glaxosmithkline-okairos-idUSBRE94 
T0O120130530 [https://perma.cc/NMW7-WDLG].  Okairos’s portfolio included vaccines 
against hepatitis C and malaria that were undergoing phase II testing, as well as early 
vaccine technology targeting syncytial virus (RSV), tuberculosis, Ebola, and HIV.  Some 
of Okairos’s technology was also expected to be of use in cancer-related R&D.  Id. 
208. Press Release, GlaxoSmithKline, GSK Strengthens Vaccines Business With Acquisition of 
Okairos (May 29, 2013), http://www.okairos.com/files/documents/3_GSK-strengthens-
vaccines-business-with-acquisition-of-Okairos-29-05-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDY6-NQT2] 
(“Under the terms of the transaction, GSK will take full ownership of the company and thus 
assume ownership of early stage assets for diseases such as respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), 
Funders 
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surrounding the rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine against the outbreak clock,209 GSK was 
able to start clinical development of the vaccine immediately.  That process was 
bolstered in late 2014 by funding from BARDA210 and the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation.211 
The remaining frontrunner vaccine (Ad26-EBOV/MVA-EBOV), another 
adenovirus-based vaccine,212 stands out for two reasons.  First, it was funded 
primarily by a grant from the Innovative Medicines Initiative,213 the world’s 
largest public-private partnership in the life sciences, and the product of a 
collaboration between the European Commission and the European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA)214  The 
recipient of the grant, the large pharmaceutical company Johnson & Johnson 
(J&J), thus received a substantial amount of funding from the private sector in 
the form of the European pharmaceutical industry represented by EFPIA. 
The second reason this vaccine differs from the previous two candidates is 
that clinical development involved two large pharmaceutical companies: J&J 
partnered with Denmark-based Bavarian Nordic to “accelerate and scale up” 
clinical development of the vaccine.215  This is a deviation from the small-big 
pharma collaboration model, in which a player with modest resources either 
develops or acquires IP on an early-stage vaccine targeting a relatively neglected 
disease.  J&J did, however, rely on preexisting vaccine technology developed by 
the U.S. National Institutes of Health and NIAID (as indicated by Figure 2), 






hepatitis C virus (HCV), malaria, tuberculosis, ebola [sic] and HIV, supplementing the 
company’s existing vaccines pipeline.”). 
209. See infra Subpart II.B. 
210. In the amount of U.S. $12.9 million.  Fisher & Geddes, supra note 118, at 18. 
211. Approximately U.S. $3 million.  Id. at 17. 
212. See Chappell, supra note 183. 
213. The grant totaled over U.S. $100 million.  See Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, Johnson & 
Johnson Announces Formation of Ebola Vaccine Development Consortia, Gains Funding 
From Innovative Medicines Initiative (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.jnj.com/media-center/press-
releases/johnson-johnson-announces-formation-of-ebola-vaccine-development-consortia-
gains-funding-from-innovative-medicines-initiative [https://perma.cc/8M83-4DYN]. 
214. IMI Mission and Objectives, INNOVATIVE MEDS. INITIATIVE, https://www.imi.europa.eu/ 
content/mission [https://perma.cc/WA8G-W6GD]. 
215. See Cormac Sheridan, Johnson & Johnson, Bavarian Nordic Ink $187M Deal for Ebola Virus 
Vaccine, BIOWORLD, http://www.bioworld.com/content/johnson-johnson-bavarian-nordic-
ink-187m-deal-ebola-virus-vaccine [https://perma.cc/U8DM-RT3K]. 





















Figure 3: AD26-EBOV/MVA-EBOV VACCINE CANDIDATE 
Clinical trials for these three Ebola vaccine candidates and several others are 
ongoing.  The latest wave of trials began in April 2017.216  While results appear 
promising,217 there is not a reliable timeline to predict when the first approved 
vaccines will enter the market.  The 2014–16 outbreak created incentives for 
Ebola R&D that will benefit post-outbreak populations and potentially minimize 
the burden caused by future outbreaks.  Nevertheless, this temporary spike in 
incentives is not enough to guarantee the necessary levels of sustained Ebola 
R&D in the future.  Already in late 2015, when Ebola and Zika raged 
concomitantly, several institutions began moving existing Ebola resources 
  
216. Ebola: New Trial Launched in West Africa to Evaluate Three Vaccination Strategies, NAT’L INST. 
OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/news-
events/ebola-new-trial-launched-west-africa-evaluate-three-vaccination-strategies 
[https://perma.cc/E6YB-9TEK]. 
217. See News Release, World Health Org., Final Trial Results Confirm Ebola Vaccine Provides High 
Protection Against Disease (Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ 
releases/2016/ebola-vaccine-results/en [https://perma.cc/4LG4-89SP]; see also Donald G. 
McNeil Jr., New Ebola Vaccine Gives 100 Percent Protection, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/health/ebola-vaccine.html. 
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toward the response to Zika.218  In the United States, of the U.S. $589 million 
that were used to fund the response to Zika in 2016, U.S. $500 million were 
diverted from Ebola funds.219  This suggests that the combination of IP rights 
and outbreak-induced incentives is not enough to generate desirable levels of 
systemic R&D for most outbreak diseases.  Scholars analyzing biopharmaceutical 
innovation in areas with severe market failures have proposed different 
mechanisms to create supplemental incentives streams.  A short survey of these 
types of incentives can be found in Part III, alongside a brief discussion of 
measures aimed at reducing IP inefficiencies during the early- and post-
outbreak periods. 
b. The Zika Vaccine Race 
As with Ebola, the Zika R&D landscape was bolstered by the impact of the 
2015–16 outbreak.  The WHO declared it a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern in February 2016.220  Research conducted during the 
early stages of the outbreak confirmed suspicions of a link between Zika 
infection and Guillain-Barré syndrome.221  It also showed that, if contracted 
during pregnancy, the virus might cause microcephaly in newborns.222 
Even though the Zika virus was identified nearly two decades earlier than 
Ebola, science on Zika was significantly less developed at the beginning of the 
outbreak.223  Until 2015, Zika “was not considered to be a major pathogen.”224  
Since the outbreak began, close to one thousand scientific publications on Zika 
  
218. This was the case, for instance, of the WHO.  See Dylan Scott, Millions in Ebola 
Funding, A Casualty of Zika Virus, May Not Be Replenished, STAT (June 1, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/06/01/ebola-zika-virus-funding [https://perma.cc/6UY6-
WWYR]. 
219. See Andrew Joseph, Obama Administration Diverts $500 Million From Ebola Response to 
Zika Fight, STAT (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/04/06/white-house-
zika-call [https://perma.cc/833Y-FC66]. 
220. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., ZIKA STRATEGIC RESPONSE PLAN 8 (2016).  By the time the WHO 
lifted the Public Health Emergency in November 2016, over sixty countries and territories had 
reported cases of Zika infection.  See Zika Cumulative Cases—16 November 2017, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG., http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=article& 
id=12390&Itemid=42090&lang=en.  Nearly five thousand cases were reported in the United 
States alone.  See 2016 Case Counts in the US, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/zika/reporting/2016-case-counts.html [https://perma.cc/QP4F-VGWF]. 
221. See Cao-Lormeau et al., supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
222. Johansson et al., supra note 154. 
223. See Jeff Lyon, Zika: Worse Than Thalidomide?, 316 JAMA 1246, 1248 (2016) (discussing 
the areas on which long-term Zika research is still needed). 
224. Alan D. T. Barrett, Zika Vaccine Candidates Progress Through Nonclinical Development and 
Enter Clinical Trials, NPJ VACCINES (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.nature.com/articles/ 
npjvaccines201623. 
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have appeared.225  The discovery of the relationship between the Zika infection 
and its severe symptoms spiked incentives to R&D on multiple fronts.  The 
most prominent is, unsurprisingly, vaccine development: As of mid-2017, there 
were at least forty entities involved in Zika R&D on different types of 
vaccines.226  On a smaller scale, the outbreak also directed a portion of R&D 
efforts into the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vector-control 
methods.227 
One of the main R&D strategies to develop Zika vaccines was to build on 
preexisting vaccine technology targeting similar viruses like Yellow Fever or 
dengue (both flaviviruses like Zika).228  This was the approach taken by the 
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (hereinafter the Army) in the United 
States, which produced the world’s leading vaccine candidate in the Zika race.229  
Nevertheless, given the scientific unknowns surrounding the Zika virus, 
the vaccine race has been characterized by multiple approaches, with several 
funding institutions supporting parallel and competing R&D strategies.230  
According to the most recent data collected by the WHO, the Zika R&D 
pipeline includes four different categories of products:231 Zika diagnostics (of 
which there are three types: nucleic acid test kits,232 ELISA-based tests233 and 
RDT-type tests234); therapeutics;235 vaccines;236 and vector-control methods.237  
While diagnostics and vaccines are deemed strategic areas, R&D on Zika-
related therapeutic products is not considered a priority due to the “complexity 
of testing and using novel therapeutic drugs in pregnant women,”238 the most 
  
225. Id. 
226. See infra Table 2. 
227. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., CURRENT ZIKA PRODUCT PIPELINE 5 (2016), http://www.who.int/ 
blueprint/priority-diseases/key-action/zika-rd-pipeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X7D-AGKB]. 
228. Id. 
229. See Cheryl Pellerin, Walter Reed Scientists Test Zika Vaccine Candidate, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. 
(June 9, 2016), http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/795226/walter-reed-scientists-
test-zika-vaccine-candidate [https://perma.cc/Y5RG-7D8J]; see also infra Part II (discussing 
transactional IP inefficiencies that have affected the licensing of the Army’s vaccine). 
230. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 227.  Most pharmaceutical companies, however, have 
chosen to pursue a single approach (such as purified vaccines or DNA-based vaccines, but 
not both). 
231. Id.  The WHO collected, but did not verify this data.  Id. at 7. 
232. Id. at 7–8. 
233. Id. at 9–10. 
234. Id. at 10–11. 
235. Id. at 12–13. 
236. Id. at 14. 
237. Id. at 15–16. 
238. Id. at 4.  See also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Zika Virus—Pregnancy, 
https://www.cdc.gov/zika/pregnancy/index.html [https://perma.cc/L6GF-UTYB] (noting 
that the Zika virus can be transmitted from a pregnant person to the fetus). 
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at-risk population for Zika infection.  Even with a potentially small market, at 
least ten companies are engaged in diagnostic development for the Zika virus.239 
As far as vaccines are concerned, by the time the WHO declared the end of 
the Zika Public Health Emergency in November of 2016, there were close to 
twenty active projects.240  Over a dozen private-sector entities were involved in 
Zika R&D, as well as several research institutions.241  Additional entities are still 
announcing early-stage product development242 as noted in the overview of 
Zika R&D projects listed below in this Part. 
Similar to what happened in Ebola R&D, the bulk of Zika R&D is taking 
place in the United States and Europe.  However, there are also three projects 
that have been initiated by entities in more affluent and technically 
sophisticated developing countries: In India, Bharat Pharmaceuticals,243 a large 
private-sector company, is currently developing two different types of vaccine; 
in Brazil, Bio-Manguinhos/Fiocruz, a scientific research unit within a Ministry 
of Health–sponsored foundation,244 has three active Zika vaccine projects; and 
also in Brazil, Butantan, a research institute and one of the world’s leading 
centers for dengue vaccine R&D,245 is developing two different Zika vaccines. 
 
  
239. According to data collected by the WHO, these companies include bioMerieux, Alere, 
Cepheid, Hema Diagnostic Systems, Atomo Diagnostics, OraSure, Access Bio, Chembioio, 
DiaSorin, and Siemens.  Id. at 11. 
240. This list has been updated to reflect changes that took place after the WHO updated its 
own data for the most recent time.  Some of the players involved in Zika vaccine 
development are working collaboratively.  Id. at 3–5.  Some of the funders are involved in 
more than one project (this is especially true of government funding in the United States). 
241. Id. at 5. 
242. See infra Table 2. 
243. BHARAT PHARMACEUTICALS, http://www.bharatpharmaceuticals.com/#&panel1-1 
[https://perma.cc/4BU6-C6WU]. 
244. BIO-MANGUINHOS/FIOCRUZ, https://www.bio.fiocruz.br [https://perma.cc/Q94T-Y7CZ]. 
245. See Marcelo De Franco & Jorge Kalil, The Butantan Institute: History and Future 
Perspectives, 8 PLOS NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES 1 (2014). 
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Institution Country Vaccine Type 










(1) live dengue recombinant 
(vaccine technology licensed 
from NIAID) 
(2) inactivated purified 
Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) U.S. 
(1) VLP 
(2) live recombinant 
adenovirus
GeoVax (pharma) U.S. MVA-VLP platform
GlaxoSmithKline (pharma) U.S. RNA







(private research foundation) France 2 vectored vaccines 
Moderna/Valera, Biomedical 




NewLink Genetics (pharma) U.S. purified inactivated virus 
NIH: Vaccine Research 
Center (VRC) at the National 
Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID)
U.S. 
(1) Zika-targeted mutation 
live vaccine 
(2) DNA 
(3) VSV recombinant 
Novavax (pharma) U.S. E protein
  
246. VLP stands for virus-like particles, multiprotein structures commonly used in vaccine 
development.  See António Roldão et al., Virus-Like Particles in Vaccine Development, 9 
EXPERT REV. VACCINES. 1149, 1149 (2010). 
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Institution Country Vaccine Type 
Replikins (pharma) U.S. synthetic peptides
Sanofi (pharma) France (1) chimera(2) undisclosed
Takeda (pharma)/BARDA Japan/U.S. inactivated whole virion vaccine
Themis Bioscience (pharma) Austria vector vaccine
Valneva (pharma) France purified inactivated virus 
Walter Reed Army Institute 
of Research (Army), National 
Institutes of Health (NIH); 
National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Diseases 
(NIAID); Biomedical 
Advanced Research and 
Development Authority 
(BARDA); Sanofi (pharma; 
funding recipient)
U.S. purified inactivated virus (ZPIV) 
Inactive or early stage projects: CureVac, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, 
Oxford University, Pax Vax, Pfizer, Profectus Biosciences, Protein Sciences, 
Sementis, Sinergium
Table 2: Zika Vaccine R&D Projects247 
In addition to the Army’s leading candidate (an inactivated vaccine 
known as ZPIV), as of mid-2017 there are two other advanced vaccine 
candidates: a DNA vaccine developed by Inovio, a small Pennsylvania-
based biotech company, in partnership with GeneOne Life Science, a South 
Korean biopharmaceutical company; and a DNA vaccine developed by the 
Vaccine Research Center at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (NIAID).248  In this group, the Inovio vaccine is the only one that 
was not funded by the NIH.  All candidates in the group are currently in 
clinical development.  The Army-developed vaccine has been undergoing 
  
247. Updated and adapted from: WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 227. 
248. GLOBAL RESEARCH COLLABORATION FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE PREPAREDNESS, ZIKA VACCINE 
WORKING GROUP OVERVIEW 1 (2016), https://www.glopid-r.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
12/zika_working_group_vaccines_overview_november_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7ZZ-
CXRR] [hereinafter GLOPID-R]. 
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phase I trials since late 2016, with phase II planned for early 2018.249  Inovio 
concluded phase I in June 2015 and is conducting phase II trials in Puerto 
Rico.250  NIAID launched phase I in late 2016 and scheduled phase II for 
2017.251 
The group of advanced vaccine candidates in the Zika race splits into two 
very different categories in terms of vaccine type.  Two candidates are DNA-
based vaccines: the vaccine developed by Inovio in partnership with GeneOne; 
and one of the vaccines developed at the Vaccine Research Center, which is part 
of the NIH.252  The remaining vaccine in the group of advanced candidates 
relies on a different type of vaccine R&D, virus inactivation; this is the ZPIV 
vaccine, developed by the Army in collaboration with NIAID and Biomedical 
Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). 
DNA vaccines and inactivated vaccines are at opposite sides of the 
spectrum in vaccine development.253  Vaccine inactivation relies on a well-
understood process that has been used for many decades.254  DNA vaccines, in 
contrast, are considered a less traditional vaccine platform.255  In the early 
  
249. Id. 
250. Press Release, Inovio, Inovio Launches Zika Vaccine Trial in Midst of Puerto Rico Epidemic to 
Explore Early Signals of Vaccine Efficacy (Aug. 29, 2016), http://ir.inovio.com/default.aspx? 
SectionId=5cc5ecae-6c48-4521-a1ad-480e593e4835&LanguageId=1&PressReleaseId=96e 
efbb4-9716-431e-b4b2-67f58281eb5e [https://perma.cc/VSA5-URJM]. 
251. Jennifer Abbasi, Zika Vaccine Enters Clinical Trials, 316 JAMA 1249 (2016).  A second 
group of vaccines is currently in the late stages of preclinical development, with phase I 
clinical trials expected to have begun in the second half of 2017: the live dengue vaccine 
that Brazil’s Butantan Institute licensed from NIAID; the Moderna/BARDA mRNA 
vaccine; and the inactivated vaccine developed by Indian pharmaceutical giant Bharat.  
GLOPID-R, supra note 248, at 1–2.  At least eight other vaccine candidates currently in late 
preclinical development were expected to begin phase I trials in late 2017.  Id. at 2. 
252. Since the early stages of the Zika vaccine race, the NIH has also funded the development of 
two other non-DNA vaccines, in partnership with the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases, see Table 2.  The NIH has also been part of a second Zika vaccine 
partnership, the one led by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.  Id. 
253. Inactivated vaccines use killed viruses or bacteria to stimulate weakened immune responses 
from the organism.  Examples include the vaccines for hepatitis A, influenza, polio, cholera, 
and rabies.  For other examples, see CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. 
VACCINES (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/downloads/appendices/ 
B/us-vaccines.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JAR-THEY]. 
254. See Different Types of Vaccines, THE HISTORY OF VACCINES, https://www.historyof 
vaccines.org/content/articles/different-types-vaccines [https://perma.cc/K9X5-63AZ]. 
255. See, e.g., Richard Harris, Testing Begins on an Experimental Zika Vaccine With Inactivated 
Virus, NPR (Nov. 7, 2016, 12:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/ 
11/07/501015866/testing-begins-on-an-experimental-zika-vaccine-with-inactivated-virus.  
DNA vaccines rely on technology that is much more recent than vaccine inactivation, which 
dates to the early 1990s.  An injection of DNA plasmid is used to trigger a strong immune 
response from an organism.  See De-chu Tang et al., Genetic Immunization Is a Simple 
Method for Eliciting an Immune Response, 356 NATURE 152 (1992); Jeffrey B. Ulmer et al., 
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2000s, the NIH funded R&D on DNA vaccines, including one that targeted 
West Nile, a flavivirus like Zika.256  Early results were promising, but no 
pharmaceutical company showed interest in the vaccine.257  Adding to this—a 
feature inherent to non-mainstream diseases, as discussed in Part I—further 
research has also raised questions surrounding the efficacy of DNA vaccines.258  
For this reason, although there are DNA vaccines for animals on the market,259 
no DNA vaccine for use in humans has ever been approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA).260 
Yet the results from early clinical trials of the NIH-sponsored Zika DNA 
vaccine appear promising.261  Regardless of final outcomes concerning this 
particular vaccine, the race prompted by the 2015–16 outbreak has not only 
contributed to Zika-specific R&D, but it has also increased knowledge of DNA 
vaccine platforms in a significant way. 
While there is great buzz surrounding Zika DNA vaccines, inactivated 
vaccines remain the prevalent approach in the global race.  The Army’s 
frontrunner (ZPIV vaccine) is perhaps the best embodiment of how a change in 
the incentives landscape impacts R&D timelines.  The Army decided to develop 
  
Heterologous Protection Against Influenza by Injection of DNA Encoding a Viral Protein, 259 
SCIENCE 1745 (1993); see also John J. Donnelly et al., DNA Vaccines: Progress and Challenges, 
175 J. IMMUNOLOGY 633 (2005); Bernadette Ferraro et al., Clinical Applications of DNA 
Vaccines: Current Progress, 53 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 296 (2011) (describing current 
research on how plasmid DNA triggers immune responses).  In addition to DNA plasmid, 
ongoing research also suggests that RNA and other molecules might be used in future 
vaccines.  See DNA Vaccines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/biologicals/ 
areas/vaccines/dna/en [https://perma.cc/2NMP-AF5G]. 
256. See Julie E. Martin et al., A West Nile Virus DNA Vaccine Induces Neutralizing Antibody in 
Healthy Adults During a Phase 1 Clinical Trial, 196 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1732 (2007); see 
also Kendall Powell, DNA Vaccines—Back in the Saddle Again?, 22 NATURE BIOTECH. 799 
(2004) (describing current challenges surrounding DNA-based vaccines). 
257. Katie Thomas, The Race for a Zika Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/business/testing-the-limits-of-biotech-in-the-race-
for-a-zika-vaccine.html. 
258. See, e.g., Tom-Ole Løvås et al., DNA Vaccines: MHC II-Targeted Vaccine Protein Produced 
by Transfected Muscle Fibres Induces a Local Inflammatory Cell Infiltrate in Mice, 9 PLOS 
ONE 1 (2014). 
259. See Michele A. Kutzler & David B. Weiner, DNA Vaccines: Ready for Prime Time?, 9 
NATURE REVS. GENETICS 776 (2008). 
260. See Guidance for Industry: Considerations for Plasmid DNA Vaccines for Infectious Disease 
Indications, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/guidancecomplianceregulatory 
information/guidances/vaccines/ucm074770.htm [https://perma.cc/XT2L-QTP3] (last updated 
June 17, 2015). 
261. Jennifer Govero et al., Zika Virus Infection Damages the Testes in Mice, 540 NATURE 438, 
438 (2016). 
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a Zika vaccine in January 2016.262  Scientists resorted to cell-based technology 
that had already been used by the Army to develop a vaccine for Japanese 
encephalitis (also a flavivirus) in 2009.263  The first experiments began in April, 
with results submitted to Nature magazine in May and published in June.264  
Clinical trials for ZPIV began in November 2016, less than a year after the 
Army entered the Zika race.265 
With vaccine development taking an average of eight to twelve years, the 
timeline of ZPIV illustrates how certain catalytic events (in this case, a 
transnational outbreak) override the market-based dynamics that IP 
introduces into scientific R&D.  Adding to that, the borrowing of existing 
technology to speed up R&D in the flavivirus family contributes to other R&D 
areas—for instance, intra-genus R&D through reuse and adaptation of existing 
vaccine platforms or similar technology.  This approach constitutes a relatively 
inexpensive way of increasing vaccine R&D in general and may result in the 
unearthing of potential vaccine candidates for use in future, unpredictable 
outbreaks. 
But the technology-borrowing that took place at the Army also reinforces 
the idea that the perverse effects of IP incentives have delayed the existence of 
the first Zika vaccine.  If it is indeed possible to develop a safe and effective 
vaccine in such a short span of time and by resorting to known technology, then 
before the outbreak, Zika must already have been low-hanging fruit.  That no 
one bridged that gap—in the same way that the West Nile vaccine candidate 
failed to attract commercial attention a few years before Zika—underscores the 
idea of a general lack of “R&D preparedness” for outbreak diseases.266 
From a public health perspective, the WHO now considers Zika to be a 
“chronic threat,” framing the disease in a similar way it frames malaria.267  As 
  
262. Annette M. Boyle, Army Research Produces Zika Vaccine Candidate in Record Time, U.S. 
MED. (Aug. 2016), http://www.usmedicine.com/agencies/department-of-defense-dod/army-
research-produces-zika-vaccine-candidate-in-record-time [https://perma.cc/SM8K-25Q5]. 
263. NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 155. 
264. Rafael A. Larocca et al., Vaccine Protection Against Zika Virus From Brazil, 536 NATURE 
474 (2016). 
265. Zika Virus Purified Inactivated Vaccine (ZPIV) Accelerated Vaccination Schedule Study 
(Z001), U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED., https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT02937233 
[https://perma.cc/5VU7-AP2M] (last updated Sept. 29, 2017); see also Kathleen Curthoys, 
Human Testing Begins on Zika Virus Vaccine Developed by the Army, ARMYTIMES (Nov. 8, 
2016), https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2016/11/08/human-testing-begins-
on-zika-virus-vaccine-developed-by-the-army [https://perma.cc/EVN4-RGXX]. 
266. R&D BLUEPRINT, supra note 7, at 6. 
267. See Fifth Meeting of the Emergency Regarding Zika Virus, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
(Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2016/zika-fifth-ec/en 
[https://perma.cc/VNY3-H68G]. 
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the Organization points out, “[m]any aspects of this disease and associated 
consequences still remain to be understood, but this can best be done through 
sustained research.”268  Yet, even now that the association between Zika and 
severe neurological and congenital defects is known, the virus will likely 
continue to be perceived as less harmful than Ebola.269  Zika is also unlikely to 
benefit from the extra layer of R&D incentives that attach to Ebola by virtue of 
its having been deemed a material threat to national security.270 
Even with Zika R&D making remarkable progress, there are further 
problems to consider.  Of course, expedited Zika R&D (as is the case with 
Ebola) is of no avail to patients affected by the 2015–16 outbreak, or until a safe 
and effective vaccine enters the market.  But the availability of a Zika vaccine is 
still not enough to ensure that future patients will be able to benefit from it.271  
In exchange for an R&D challenge that is met, the patent bargain rewards the 
innovator with market exclusivity, opening the door for commercialization of 
the invention in monopoly-like conditions.  IP that emerges from outbreak-
induced R&D is subject to the same rules that apply to other inventions.  In the 
case of Zika—even though the vaccine-race timeline indicates that IP alone 
failed to incentivize R&D—currently emerging post-outbreak vaccine 
technology is patent-protected.  In at least one case,272 the initial developer of a 
Zika vaccine considered licensing it to a private-sector pharmaceutical 
company under an exclusive agreement,273 a decision that raises questions 
about the affordability of vaccines for future target populations.  I address these 
issues, which embody a different type of IP-related inefficiency,274 in Part II. 
  
268. Id. 
269. See Daniel R. Lucey & Lawrence O. Gostin, The Emerging Zika Pandemic: Enhancing 
Preparedness, 315 JAMA 865, 866 (2016) (contrasting the transregional magnitude of the 
2015 Zika outbreak with previous outbreaks); Barrett, supra note 224 (noting that the 
smaller scale and impact of pre-2015 outbreaks caused the Zika virus not to be perceived as 
a major pathogen). 
270. PHEMCE, supra note 123. 
271. Infra Subpart II.C. 
272. The Army’s ZPIV vaccine, described in Subpart I.C.2.a. 
273. The Army is in the process of licensing ZPIV to French pharmaceutical company Sanofi.  
Infra Subpart II.C. 
274. For purposes of this Article, IP inefficiencies arising after an outbreak and spikes in R&D 
incentives are grouped together under what I have called “transactional IP inefficiencies.”  
Infra Subpart II.A. 
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II. INEFFICIENCIES AND LACK OF IP PREPAREDNESS AFTER AN OUTBREAK 
STARTS 
A. Transactional IP Inefficiencies 
So far, the Article has addressed the problem of IP qua incentives to R&D 
in the context of outbreak diseases.  As the cases of Ebola and Zika illustrate, 
large-scale outbreaks temporarily heighten incentives to R&D, igniting a race 
for the development of vaccines funded through a realignment of private, 
public, and public-private players to support the development of new vaccines. 
However, the overall impact of IP on outbreak diseases is broader than the 
domain of incentives.  For pathogens on which there has been a modicum of 
pre-outbreak R&D, it is likely that technology protectable by IP rights will have 
emerged before the start of an outbreak.  Recall for instance the Ebola vaccine 
developed in Canada (rVSV-ZEBOV), which was protected by patent rights a 
full decade before the beginning of the 2014–16 outbreak.275  While a significant 
amount of pre-outbreak R&D is conducted at government level—as was the 
case for several Ebola and Zika vaccine candidates—it is not uncommon to see 
the resulting IP migrate elsewhere (or be shared with additional partners) as 
soon as enhanced funding streams open up.  Governmental research 
institutions remain the default locus for R&D in under-incentivized areas, but 
private entities often appear during the phases of clinical trials, large-scale 
vaccine manufacturing, and obtainment of regulatory approval.  When 
transfers of preexisting IP occur—and especially in cases where a private 
company takes over the R&D process rather than partnering with a research 
institution—it is desirable that IP rights change hands as quickly as possible.  
With outbreak-spiked funding being necessarily short-lived, a delay in 
transfers of IP rights after an outbreak starts constitutes another form of 
inefficiency that impacts not only R&D timelines, but also preparedness for 
future outbreaks. 
Even in the case of pathogens for which there are virtually no pre-
outbreak R&D, like Zika, transfers of IP rights during the final stages of vaccine 
R&D may still produce detrimental effects at yet another level.  Consider now 
the vaccine developed by the Army in the wake of the 2015–16 Zika outbreak.  
In 2017, the Army licensed its vaccine candidate (ZPIV) to a French 
pharmaceutical company, a process that drew much criticism due to its opacity 
and to the lack of provisions dealing with affordability issues, as described in 
  
275. Can. Patent No. WO 2004/011488 A2, supra note 132. 
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greater detail below.276  If IP that emerges from new R&D is licensed in a way 
that exacerbates the monopoly-like qualities of the patent bargain, it is 
possible that vaccines end up being made available at higher costs than 
needed, thus pricing out277 certain segments of the population who cannot 
afford them.278  IP preparedness entails anticipating this scenario and making 
sure ex ante that licensing agreements contain provisions guaranteeing 
affordability of vaccines. 
These types of IP inefficiencies, termed here “transactional” for 
descriptive purposes, are distinguishable from the ones covered in Part I.  
Transactional inefficiencies embody a malfunction that occurs during the 
transfer of IP rights.  From a temporal viewpoint, these inefficiencies occur 
after an outbreak erupts, as opposed to incentives inefficiencies, which 
characterize the pre-outbreak phase. 
However, even though transactional inefficiencies impact transfers of IP 
that take place after an outbreak begins, they also differ among themselves.  The 
first group of transactional inefficiencies—illustrated below through an Ebola 
case study—encompasses problems with the transfer of preexisting IP rights 
during the early stages of an outbreak.279  In contrast, the second group—
illustrated below through a Zika case study—refers to the transfer of emerging 
IP rights after an outbreak is over (or possibly during its very late stages).  The 
following Parts address these subtypes of transactional inefficiencies in turn. 
B. Lack of IP Preparedness in the Early Stages of an Outbreak 
As discussed with respect to the role of IP as an incentives mechanism, 
some degree of inefficiency is expected as a byproduct of the patent bargain, 
which gives patent holders strong control over their exclusive rights.280  While 
  
276. Infra Subpart II.C. 
277. This is an embodiment of the phenomenon of deadweight loss described in Part I.  See 
Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
278. As further detailed below, an additional concern arises in the case of vaccines developed by 
government research institutions and then licensed to private companies, as happened 
with ZPIV.  In this scenario, if the pharmaceutical company licensed to sell the vaccine is 
left unchecked and charges profit-maximizing prices, consumers, who have already 
funded governmental R&D through taxes, will now pay a second time for the same good—
now subsidizing a private company.  See infra Subpart II.B. 
279. Infra Subpart III.A. 
280. Supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
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not unlimited,281 this control may be exerted in ways that disproportionally 
lower social welfare. 
During the early stages of an outbreak, lack of IP preparedness is tied to 
transactional inefficiencies affecting the transfer of preexisting technology.  
With funding streams opening up once the outbreak begins, preexisting 
technology might be needed to expedite the R&D of vaccine candidates.  The 
transfer of this technology, however, might not occur as speedily as necessary.  
The following case study on the transfer of patented Ebola technology shortly 
after the beginning of the Ebola outbreak illustrates this scenario.  The case 
study focuses on the leading Ebola vaccine candidate (rVSV-ZEBOV), which 
was mapped in greater detail in Part I.282 
Broadly speaking, negotiations surrounding the preexisting IP needed for 
outbreak-induced R&D on Ebola vaccine candidates proceeded at an 
unusually fast pace.  In fact, more than one vaccine candidate was pushed 
through the R&D pipeline before all IP licensing provisions were agreed upon 
(as well as some other contractual provisions).283  But there was one significant 
exception to the expedited model.  This case involved NewLink Genetics, the 
small284 Iowa-based pharmaceutical company that had acquired the IP of the 
rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine from the Canadian government in 2011.285 
Even before the outbreak, rVSV-ZEBOV was considered one of the 
“most-promising strategies” in Ebola R&D.286  NewLink, however, did not 
move the vaccine through its pipeline for years.287  When the 2014–16 outbreak 
began and incentives for Ebola R&D spiked, the company finally turned its 
attention to rVSV-ZEBOV.288  However, it soon became apparent that 
NewLink lacked the resources to manufacture the vaccine.289  Even in the face 
of mounting scrutiny and a growing public health crisis, NewLink delayed 
  
281. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 209(a) (2012) (subjecting the licensing of federally owned inventions 
to certain criteria that take into account the public interest). 
282. Supra Figure 1. 
283. See Julia Barnes-Weise & Ana Santos Rutschman, Ebola and the Accidental Consortia, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 7, 2015, 2:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julia-barnesweise/ 
post_9271_b_7019058.html [https://perma.cc/2KQU-EJEW]. 
284. To this day, NewLink’s footprint remains discreet.  See NEWLINK GENETICS, supra note 139 
and accompanying text. 
285. Id. 
286. Andrea Marzi et al., Vesicular Stomatitis Virus-Based Ebola Vaccines With Improved Cross-
Protective Efficacy, 204 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1066, 1067 (2011). 
287. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
288. From the beginning of the licensing agreement, it took seventeen quarters for the vaccine 
to enter clinical trials.  See Amir Attaran & Jason W. Nickerson, Is Canada Patent Deal 
Obstructing Ebola Vaccine Development?, 384 LANCET S61, S61 (2014). 
289. Id. 
IP Preparedness 1247 
	
	
licensing of rVSV-ZEBOV.290  Although back-traced to late 2013, by March 
2014 the outbreak was a matter of international concern.291  A Public Health 
Emergency was declared in August.292  It was not until November—at this point 
under pressure from the WHO, among others—that NewLink entered into its 
licensing agreement with one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies, 
Merck.293  The latter rushed manufacturing of the vaccine, and started clinical 
trials for rVSV-ZEBOV shortly thereafter.294 
Having originally acquired the rights to rVSV-ZEBOV for U.S. $205,000, 
NewLink received U.S. $30 million for transferring IP rights to Merck, with an 
additional U.S. $20 million due at the beginning of clinical trials.295  If rVSV-
ZEBOV gains regulatory approval and is commercialized, NewLink will also be 
entitled to additional royalties.  These amounts constitute a patent-enabled 
windfall, as NewLink did not contribute to innovative R&D—or to any type of 
R&D, for that matter.  By taking advantage of its position as the rights holder of 
a happenstance portfolio, it circumvented the patent bargain through parasitic 
exploitation of IP rights on technology developed by the public sector.296  
Moreover, Merck succeeded in starting clinical trials in under two months after 
obtaining a license for rVSV-ZEBOV.  In this context, NewLink’s nonworking 
of the patent, coupled with the refusal to license the vaccine for a period of over 
three months, is likely to have delayed the beginning of clinical trials for the 
leading vaccine candidate during a severe public health crisis. 
  
290. Id. 
291. The Institut Pasteur in Lyon was the first entity to identify the virus as belonging to the 
Ebola family, on March 21, 2014.  See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Origins of the 2014 Ebola 
Epidemic, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/virus-origin/en. 
292. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
293. See Helen Braswell, Canadian-Made Ebola Vaccine Gets Help From Merck, TORONTO STAR 
(Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.thestar.com/business/2014/11/24/canadianmade_ebola_ 
vaccine_gets_help_from_merck.html [https://perma.cc/T6VY-X7TB]; Elizabeth Payne, The 
Story of ‘the Canadian Vaccine’ That Beat Back Ebola, OTTAWA CITIZEN (Sept. 2, 2016, 5:11 
PM), http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/the-canadian-vaccine-how-scientists-in-a-
country-without-a-single-case-of-ebola-wrestle-the-deadly-disease-to-the-gorund.  
294. See J.A. Regules et al., A Recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus Ebola Vaccine, 376 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 330, 333 (2017). 
295. Lisa Schnirring, NewLink, Merck Deal Boosts Prospects for Ebola Vaccine, CIDRAP (Nov. 
24, 2014), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2014/11/newlink-merck-deal-
boosts-prospects-ebola-vaccine [https://perma.cc/4U9R-C3V6]. 
296. It can be argued that NewLink acquired the rights at market value before the outbreak 
altered the incentives landscape (and consequentially altered the market value for the 
technology in question).  Nonetheless, the patent bargain rewards innovation and, in this 
case, the one entity that did not contribute any innovative R&D was (1) over-rewarded and 
(2) used the patent in a way that hindered expedited R&D during a period of public health 
crisis. 
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NewLink’s behavior illustrates a different type of IP-related inefficiency, 
now in the form of a hold-up in the transfer of technology during the early 
stages of an outbreak.  To be sure, this was the only case in which an entity 
hindered the transfer of IP during this outbreak (and in its immediate 
aftermath).  However, what happened with NewLink fits squarely into the 
general mold of outbreak-disease R&D and is therefore replicable.  As seen 
above, basic R&D is very often conducted by the public sector during the pre-
outbreak period.  The resulting IP is relatively cheap due to the underlying 
market failure, making it affordable to small private-sector companies.  While 
many small biopharmaceutical companies do engage in innovative R&D (for 
example, as Okairos did before the outbreak),297 others might either lack the 
capacity to develop the technology or choose to wait for a catalyst that will raise 
the value of the corresponding IP.  A scenario in which the NewLink hold-up 
repeats itself is not only possible, it is also logical from the perspective of an 
agent seeking to maximize the economic efficiency of a patent portfolio. 
In Part III, I propose a novel mechanism to counter this type of trans-
actional inefficiency in future outbreaks—a dormant license (enabling transfer 
of IP) that becomes active as soon as a formal declaration of public health 
emergency or crisis is issued.  Part III also explores the positive dimensions of 
IP negotiations that effectively sped up Ebola R&D during the early stages of 
the outbreak.  Namely, it proposes the creation of streamlined agreement 
frameworks that could be used to expedite the negotiation of provisions 
governing transfers of IP rights in situations of public health emergency.298 
C. Lack of IP Preparedness in Post-Outbreak Period 
During the early stages of an outbreak, the most significant issue with 
rights transfers is the potential for IP hold-up involving preexisting technology, 
but in the late- and post-outbreak periods, the problem shifts altogether.  Now, 
the concern centers around IP transfers of late-stage technology emerging from 
outbreak R&D.  In this situation, the problem is not one of timing or 
maximization of funding, but rather of impact of IP licensing on public health.  
The commercialization of biopharmaceutical innovation in conditions that 
over-reward the rights holder, allowable up to a certain point under domestic 
patent law,299 may lead to socially undesirable deadweight loss.300 
  
297. See GLAXOSMITHKLINE, supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
298. Infra, Subpart III.C. 
299. However, as further detailed below, 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (2012) and 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)–(e) 
(2012) pose some limits to the scope of patent rights in this context. 
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The most up-to-date case in point—and perhaps the most significant case 
in the history of vaccine licensing—has recently emerged in the context of the 
Zika vaccine race.  Throughout 2018 and 2019, several vaccine candidates are 
expected to approach the later stages of R&D.301  As seen above, the initial 
leading candidate was ZPIV, the vaccine developed by the U.S. Army.302  In 
December 2016, the Army announced the intent to license the vaccine, on 
which two patent applications were pending, to French pharmaceutical 
company Sanofi.303  The full notice of intent reads as follows: 
The Department of the Army hereby gives notice of its intent to 
grant an exclusive, royalty-bearing, revocable license to pending 
United States Provisional Patent Application 62/343,315, entitled, 
“Zika Virus Vaccine and Methods of Production” filed May 31, 2016 
and an exclusive, royalty-bearing, revocable license to pending 
United States Provisional Patent Application 62/370,260, entitled, 
“Zika Vaccine and Methods of Preparation” filed August 3, 2016 to 
Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., having its principal place of business at 1 
Discovery Drive, Swiftwater, PA 18370.304 
The notice presents two problems.  The first is the opacity: It does not 
disclose a single term of the licensing agreement beyond exclusivity.  The 
second is exclusivity itself. 
As far as opacity is concerned, the notice formally complies with the 
requirements set forth in the Patent Act for the licensing of federally funded 
inventions.305  But the lack of substantive information regarding the terms of 
the license is troubling from a public policy perspective, especially given the 
nature of the invention that is being licensed.  This has prompted 
nongovernmental organization Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) to file 
comments asking the Army: “Whose interests are served by the lack of 
transparency: the large French drug and vaccine manufacturer Sanofi, or the 
  
300. This deadweight loss takes the form of would-be consumers who cannot afford the 
vaccine. 
301. Supra Table 2.  See also Helen Branswell, As Foreign Powers Approve Ebola Vaccines, U.S. 
Drug Makers Lag in Development Pipeline, STAT (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/ 
2017/12/08/ebola-vaccine-development [https://perma.cc/65F5-W4X4]. 
302. See Pellerin, supra note 229. 
303. Intent to Grant an Exclusive License of U.S. Government-Owned Patents Notice, 81 FED. 
REG. 89,087 (Dec. 9, 2016). 
304. Id. 
305. 35 U.S.C. § 209(e) (2012). 
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U.S. taxpayers and residents who pay for the Army’s research budget, and will 
have to pay if the vaccine is approved by the FDA?”306 
The second half of the question raised by KEI ties into the problems 
raised by the exclusivity of the license.  To better understand these, it is helpful 
to take a closer look at the development of the vaccine as it approached phase 
II clinical trials in mid-2016.  While most of the development of the vaccine 
was carried out by the Army,307 Sanofi was brought onboard in July 2016 to 
help with manufacturing and to push the vaccine into phase II development.308  
That September, BARDA awarded Sanofi a U.S. $43 million contract to fund 
the manufacture of the vaccine, to which U.S. $130 million would be added if 
phase II results are promising.309  Federal funding has therefore supported 
early R&D on the vaccine (through the Army) and mid-stage R&D (through 
Sanofi). 
Federally funded inventions, which since 1980 are eligible for patent 
protection under the regime established by the Bayh-Dole Act,310 raise nuanced 
questions when it comes to reaping the economic benefits associated with 
patent exclusivity.  On the one hand, public-sector funding puts taxpayers’ 
money to use in curing a market failure, which in cases like vaccine 
development can negatively impact public health.  On the other hand, while the 
public sector plays a crucial role in jumpstarting early-stage R&D on 
underfunded goods, it often lacks the capacity to transform those goods into 
end-products.  At this stage, the entrance of a private-sector party into the R&D 
process is common, especially in the biopharmaceutical arena.  This is not an 
undesirable prospect if it ensures that the invention will enter the market and 
consumers will be able to benefit from it. 
  
306. KEI Comments RE Army Intent to Grant Exclusive License, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L 
(Mar. 10, 2017), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/KEI-March_10_2017-3rd-Comments-
Zika.pdf [https://perma.cc/EU3W-BEB2] (noting that the Army was irresponsive to requests 
for additional information concerning the terms of the proposed license). 
307. In partnership with NIAID.  See supra Table 2. 
308. Press Release, Sanofi Pasteur, BARDA Grants $43.2 Million USD to Sanofi Pasteur for Zika 
(Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.news.sanofi.us/press-releases?item=137143 [https://perma.cc/ 
H9XG-Y4YL]. 




310. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3018, 3019–28 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 200–212 (1994)).  While allowing for the patentability of research supported by federal 
funding, the Act established a limited number of accountability mechanisms.  See Arti K. 
Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded Research, 30 
NATURE BIOTECH. 953, 954–56 (2012).  See also text accompanying notes 312–15. 
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In the case of the Army’s Zika vaccine candidate, federal funds were used 
to support both the work done by the Army and the complementary work done 
by a large pharmaceutical company.  Sanofi has therefore received a financial 
incentive in exchange for its participation in the R&D process.  When patent 
exclusivity is added to that set of incentives, it might lead to a situation of over-
rewarding.  In the context of transfer of rights, an exclusive license constitutes 
the strongest form of control over the market for the protected good.  It 
prevents competition, which in turn is likely to drive prices up and cause 
deadweight loss.  When these inefficiencies affect goods like vaccines (which 
many have argued should be considered global public goods for health),311 an 
especially careful assessment of the impact of exclusivity must be made.  If 
exclusivity is granted, but not needed, at the very least we are in a scenario of 
bad innovation policy.  Senator Sanders, writing in a New York Times editorial, 
colorfully summarized the situation: 
A Zika vaccine would be a tremendous scientific advancement and 
could prevent birth defects, including severe congenital brain 
damage, in countless children around the world.  American soldiers 
serving in Zika-prone areas need it.  American consumers should not 
be forced to pay the highest price in the world for a vaccine we paid to 
help develop.  A failure by the government to demand fair prices 
from Sanofi in exchange for giving the company a monopoly would 
be only one more example of the broader insanity around American 
drug prices.312 
Though per Bayh-Dole rules the Army is entitled to apply for a patent on a 
federally funded vaccine, the terms under which it can license the 
corresponding patent(s) are not unrestricted.  Federal law establishes that a 
federally funded invention can only be licensed if exclusivity constitutes a 
“reasonable and necessary incentive” to fund late-stage R&D and bring the 
invention to the market, or promote public access to the invention in a similar 
form.313  If a license is granted on an exclusive basis, then the public-sector 
entity has to make sure that “the proposed scope of exclusivity is not greater 
than reasonably necessary to provide the incentive for bringing the invention to 
practical application”314 and that “granting the license will not tend to 
  
311. See generally WORKING GROUP 2 OF THE COMM’N ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH (2002). 
312. See Sanders, supra note 31. 
313. 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(1) (2012). 
314. Id. § 209(a)(2). 
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substantially lessen competition.”315  Additional conditions, like first preference 
for small businesses, apply to both exclusive and nonexclusive licenses.316 
Due to the opacity of the notice given by the Army, it is obviously 
impossible to make concrete determinations as to whether the exclusive license 
over the ZPIV vaccine satisfies these requirements.  However, the cumulative 
financial incentives that Sanofi stands to gain from obtaining an exclusive 
license, in addition to the BARDA funding, raise significant doubts on at least 
two points: the need for an exclusive license (vis-à-vis a nonexclusive license) to 
incentivize late-stage R&D and bring the vaccine to market; and the impact of 
the exclusivity on the affordability of the vaccine.  Overall, the Patent Act 
mandates that federally funded goods be available to the public “on reasonable 
terms”317 and it is at least questionable whether putting Sanofi in a monopoly-
like position achieves this goal. 
In August 2017, BARDA suspended funding for Zika R&D, choosing to 
focus its resources exclusively on surveillance of the disease.318  Shortly 
thereafter, Sanofi announced that it would stop developing the vaccine.319  Now 
that the Army’s only private-sector partner in this venture has pulled out due to 
funding cuts, R&D on the most promising Zika vaccine candidate has stopped.  
Had the Army chosen to work with multiple licensees, there would be a 
possibility that one of them would be able to carry on the work, albeit at slower 
speed.  With a considerable amount of innovation today taking place outside 
big pharma, within small or specialized startup companies, this prospect is not 
far-fetched. 
If it turns out that the Army-Sanofi deal would have violated the statutory 
restrictions on licensing of federally funded inventions, then the patent 
system—which failed to provide pre-outbreak incentives to Zika R&D—would 
have failed again in over-rewarding the rights holder in a way that is 
detrimental to public health. 
  
315. Id. § 209(a)(4). 
316. Id. § 209(c). 
317. 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (1994). 
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III. IMPROVING IP PREPAREDNESS FOR FUTURE OUTBREAKS 
A. IP Preparedness for Future Outbreak Diseases 
There is broad consensus that we are not prepared for future outbreaks.320  
Although the global health community expects certain pathogens to emerge in 
the near future, others lurk dormant, or even undiscovered. 
The back-to-back outbreaks of 2014–16 improved scientific knowledge of 
Ebola and Zika.  R&D strides in both fields are expected to translate into the 
first commercially available vaccines for both diseases.321  New diagnostics, 
therapies, and vector-control methods are also under development and may 
contribute to preventing or minimizing future outbreaks.322  Nevertheless, even 
in these fields—which attracted substantial amounts of attention and 
funding—experts believe that we are ill-prepared to deal with resurgences of 
the viruses.  Most prominently, this argument has been made with reference to 
Ebola, where sustained R&D is needed for years to come but has already begun 
to decrease noticeably.323  As one expert324 put it in January 2017, shortly after 
the publication of promising clinical-trial results on Ebola vaccines candidates, 
“I can’t say that all the momentum has been lost.  But it’s pretty hard to run a 
semi-truck on a lawnmower motor.  There’s not enough push and pull right 
now.  Things are happening in more of what I’d call a routine matter of trying 
to follow through on this.”325 
Zika R&D is also beginning to contend with post-outbreak challenges, 
including the lack of patient populations in which to test vaccine candidates,326 
  
320. See Fail to Prepare No More, 2 NATURE MICROBIOLOGY 1 (2017) (noting some strides in 
increasing preparedness for upcoming outbreaks); Bill Gates, The Next Outbreak? We’re Not 
Ready (Mar. 2015), https://www.ted.com/talks/bill_gates_the_next_disaster_we_re_not_ready 
[https://perma.cc/E9UJ-QD5V]. 
321. See, e.g., Jamey Keaten, Final Test Results Confirm Ebola Vaccine Highly Effective, AP NEWS 
(Dec. 23, 2016), https://apnews.com/4c64ebfd92a8411a9390633d156bd36c [https://perma.cc/ 
W52J-KAMG]. 
322. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 227. 
323. See CIDRAP, supra note 9; Branswell, supra note 9. 
324. Michael Osterholm is the director of the Center for Infectious Diseases Research and 
Policy (CIDRAP) at the University of Minnesota, which has funded research about 
successes and failures surrounding the development of the Ebola vaccine candidates. 
325. See Branswell, supra note 9. 
326. See Carmen Heredia Rodriguez, To Test Zika Vaccines, Scientists Need a New Outbreak, NPR 
(Feb. 23, 2017, 12:43 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/02/23/ 
516822252/to-test-zika-vaccines-scientists-need-a-new-outbreak.  
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while licensing of some of these candidates raises questions about the 
affordability of approved vaccines.327 
Creating better networks around Ebola, Zika, and outbreak diseases in 
general depends on combined efforts from many disciplines, among which IP 
plays an important part.  Drawing on lessons from different aspects of two case 
studies, this Article makes the case for a comprehensive understanding of the 
multidimensional effects of IP on the way we address outbreak diseases.  
Moving toward a comprehensive framework entails considering all forms of IP 
inefficiencies as interconnected aspects of a large-scale problem. 
The premise of IP preparedness is that dissociating incentives from other 
aspects of the IP cycle not only leads to an incomplete view of outbreak-disease 
R&D, but it is also fundamentally detrimental to our innovation policy.  If we 
focus solely on correcting incentives-based market failures, we may be able to 
generate higher levels of R&D—and in that sense cure or mitigate the market 
failure.  But access to any emerging innovation may be undermined if the 
patent bargain runs its course in a way that over-rewards IP-rights holders.  If 
innovators or their licensees are able to commercialize drugs and vaccines in a 
way that generates significant deadweight loss, they create a new market 
failure—by using the means devised to respond to the initial market failure.  
Both scenarios are detrimental to innovation policy for outbreak diseases.  
Similarly, we should not miss the opportunity to leverage successful natural 
experiments—such as the negotiation model for preexisting IP adopted by 
most parties during the early stages of Ebola R&D—and test their adaptability 
to future outbreaks. 
Applying this idea of IP preparedness, the following Subparts survey 
existing mechanisms that can be employed to address the different types of 
inefficiencies faced by outbreak diseases, building on the positive lessons from 
Ebola and Zika (particularly at the level of transactional IP).  Additionally, they 
propose a new mechanism to deal with an inefficiency (hold-up of preexisting 
IP) that is especially detrimental in the context of outbreak diseases. 
B. IP Preparedness in Pre- and Inter-Outbreak Periods 
Incentives to outbreak-disease R&D are not entirely lacking.  As seen in 
Part I, top-tier diseases benefit from small-scale networks of support that result 
in sustained (albeit suboptimal) levels of funding.  An example already 
mentioned is malaria, for which funding ranged consistently from just shy of 
  
327. See generally supra Subpart II.C. 
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U.S. $500 million in 2007 to U.S. $565 million in 2015,328 amounts that 
represent a four-fold increase from 1993 levels.329  Funding for malaria R&D 
was largely bolstered by three funders: the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
(the largest funder) and the public sectors in the United States and the 
European Union.330  In addition to, and benefiting from, these funding streams, 
several partnerships have populated R&D in this field.  Some are ad hoc 
product-development partnerships or nonprofits, like the Medicines for 
Malaria Venture331 and the Roll Back Malaria Partnership.332  Others are 
subprojects within larger organizations engaged in small-scale product 
development, like the nonprofit Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics 
(FIND), which focuses on six different types of underfunded diseases;333 the 
Innovative Vector Control Consortium (IVCC), a product-development 
partnership that focuses a significant amount of its resources on malaria;334 the 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi), a nonprofit specializing on 
neglected disease R&D, including malaria;335 and the Malaria Initiative, a 
program within the Gates-funded nonprofit PATH.336 
Most outbreak diseases, however, do not attract this breadth of R&D 
support.  Absent a major catalyst like the 2014–16 outbreaks, most diseases are 
permanently affected by severe market failures in the pre- and inter-outbreak 
periods.  In the aftermath of the Ebola outbreak, the United Nations (UN) 
proposed the creation of an international fund to support R&D for priority 
infectious outbreak diseases, setting the minimum threshold for the fund at 
U.S. $1 billion per year.337  While this amount pales in comparison to the overall 
yearly funding needs of the diseases identified by the WHO as priorities for 
probable outbreaks,338 it should be noted that only HIV/AIDS commands more 
  
328. See POLICY CURES RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 28. 
329. See PATH, STAYING THE COURSE?  MALARIA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN A TIME OF 
ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY 13 (2011). 
330. See Higher Research Funding Leads to 4x Rise in New Anti-Malaria Product Pipeline, 
MALARIA.COM (June 29, 2011), http://www.malaria.com/news/malaria-research-fundin 
[https://perma.cc/5LSF-Z37D]. 
331. See MEDS. FOR MALARIA VENTURE, supra note 51. 
332. RBM PARTNERSHIP, http://www.rollbackmalaria.org [https://perma.cc/5W3Q-QZGK]. 
333. FIND’s malaria portfolio is available at https://www.finddx.org/malaria. 
334. IVCC, http://www.ivcc.com [https://perma.cc/RJA7-JR4S]. 
335. DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, https://www.dndi.org [https://perma.cc/BTV8-
SF8U]. 
336. MALARIA VACCINE INITIATIVE, http://www.malariavaccine.org [http://perma.cc/VC6J-2ZKX]. 
337. See HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO HEALTH CRISES, PROTECTING HUMANITY 
FROM FUTURE HEALTH CRISES 18 (2016), http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/HLP/2016-02-
05_Final_Report_Global_Response_to_Health_Crises.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC2W-FRB4]. 
338. See R&D BLUEPRINT, supra note 7. 
1256 65 UCLA L. REV. 1200 (2018) 
	
than U.S. $1 billion per year in funding.339  This suggests that, if implemented, the 
fund would have the potential to have an actual impact on R&D on some of the 
most severely underfunded diseases. 
The UN approach is also indicative of the type of proposals that have been 
put forth to counter IP market failures at the incentives level.  Since the patent 
bargain is incapable of attracting R&D attention, or sufficient levels thereof, 
other models seek to supplement IP incentives by rewarding risk and 
investment in different ways.  The same UN report recommended the adoption 
of “direct public or private grants, tax breaks for organizations undertaking 
R&D, prizes for successful achievement of research goals, advance market 
commitments, or subsidization of basic research efforts.”340  While a full 
treatment of each individual mechanism is beyond the scope of the Article, it 
should be noted that these mechanisms have long been endorsed341 by literature 
analyzing market failures in general (and not just in the context of severely 
underfunded diseases).342  Biopharmaceutical R&D has long been considered 
one of the leading areas where patent incentives alone are in general 
suboptimal, and many of the alternative models listed above were not devised 
as specific instruments to incentivize R&D on areas with especially acute 
market failures.  Nevertheless, many of these options are already being 
explored—episodically—in the context of outbreak-disease R&D, and 
especially in the field of vaccines.  For instance, as described in previous Parts, 
vaccine procurement is a major component of the work developed by BARDA 
in the United States and Gavi in Switzerland.343 
In the early 2010s, an unusual form of incentive lodged at the FDA in the 
United States emerged and appears to have regained momentum during the 
Ebola and Zika outbreaks.  Entitled the priority review voucher, it mandates 
that the FDA award a voucher to sponsors that gain approval for drugs treating 
certain underfunded diseases.344  The award voucher is to be used at a later time 
to speed up approval of another, unrelated drug.  The second drug—the drug 
on which the voucher is used—does not necessarily have to treat an 
  
339. See POLICY CURES RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 19. 
340. See HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO HEALTH CRISES, supra note 337, at 59. 
341. As well as criticized.  See generally Roin, supra note 79; Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 94.  
342. See generally Roin, supra note 79; Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 92. 
343. FDA, supra note 193; see also  Supply and Procurement of Immunisation Products, GAVI: 
THE VACCINE ALLIANCE, http://www.gavi.org/about/gavis-business-model/vaccine-supply-
and-procurement [https://perma.cc/5HWB-2AQK] (describing Gavi’s business model). 
344. The voucher system was first proposed by Ridley et al. in 2006.  See David B. Ridley et al., 
Developing Drugs for Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. 313, 313 (2006). 
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underfunded disease.345  The basic idea is that there is a sizable economic 
advantage associated with having the second drug enter the market sooner.  
Early approval of the second drug would then constitute an incentive for the 
private sector to invest in R&D for traditionally neglected diseases.346  Because 
the vouchers are transferable, sale of an award voucher (which other companies 
would then be entitled to use to quicken approval of any drug of their choice) is 
another form of monetizing the incentive.347 
Both Ebola and Zika were added to the list of underfunded diseases that 
are eligible for a voucher during the outbreaks.348  The 21st Century Cures 
Act,349 passed in December 2016, extended the voucher program to medical 
countermeasures,350 a category that includes vaccines for chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear defense—and hence for which R&D on diseases like 
Ebola will potentially qualify. 
Nominally, these vouchers are industry-subsidized, which would 
constitute an original approach to solving the private-sector market failure in 
biopharmaceutical R&D.  In practice, however, the vouchers are being used as a 
means to expedite the approval of blockbuster drugs (such as cholesterol drugs, 
in which little to no market failure exists) with no evidence of the 
corresponding economic return actually being directed toward R&D on any 
type of neglected disease.351 
The adoption of one or more mechanisms listed above constitutes a form 
of enhancing IP preparedness by addressing the incentives side of the problem.  
The following Subparts turn to proposals dealing with inefficiencies arising 
from transfers of IP rights. 
  
345. Id. at 315. 
346. Id. at 313. 
347. Id. 
348. See S. 2917, 113th Cong. (2014); see also Pub. L. No. 113-233, 128 Stat. 2127 (2014). 
349. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255, § 2036 (2016). 
350. The FDA defines medical countermeasures as “products (biologics, drugs, devices) that 
may be used in the event of a potential public health emergency stemming from a terrorist 
attack with a biological, chemical, or radiological/nuclear material, a naturally occurring 
emerging disease, or a natural disaster.”  FDA, supra note 193. 
351. See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA: From 
Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st Century Cures Act, 26 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 71, 83 
(2017) (describing the voucher program and showing that the political goodwill associated 
with the Ebola and Zika vouchers is misaligned with the goal of incentivizing innovation). 
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C. IP Preparedness in Early-Stage Outbreaks 
The WHO pointed out that the 2014–16 Ebola outbreak demonstrated 
that “it is possible to compress R&D timelines from a decade or longer to less 
than a single year.”352  While it is debatable whether this proposition is 
universally applicable to R&D in future outbreaks, the development of the 
Ebola vaccine can be regarded as a success story from the point of view of 
expediting complex R&D against the outbreak clock. 
However, this success coexisted with inefficiencies in transactional IP, and 
they are likely to have affected the pace of R&D surrounding a vaccine that was, 
and remains to this day, the leading candidate in the Ebola vaccine race.  
Drawing on the positive aspects of IP negotiations—how multiple players came 
together and agreed on IP terms much more quickly than usual—I propose a 
mechanism that would (1) leverage these aspects to maximize efficiency in IP 
negotiations during an outbreak and (2) counteract potential inefficiencies 
arising from hold-up situations. 
This solution is based on the creation of a streamlined IP framework 
governing certain transfers of IP related to outbreak-disease technology (for 
example, vaccines).  The idea behind the IP framework is to replicate the 
expedited licensing model that several companies and institutions informally 
adopted during the early stages of the Ebola outbreak.  One factor that enabled 
the unusually swift transfer of IP for the Ebola vaccines was the fact that not all 
licensing agreements were completed by the time multiparty R&D began.353  
Nevertheless, incomplete licensing packages are not a replicable, or desirable, 
process.  Instead, this proposal is applicable in a conditioned scenario, and only 
to outbreak-disease technology developed by public-sector institutions (such as 
the National Institutes of Health in the U.S.). 
A streamlined IP framework, which in this particular case can be described 
as a dormant licensing agreement, would work according to the following 
model.  A public-sector institution develops outbreak-disease technology.  
When that technology is transferred to a private-sector company, the 
streamlined IP framework attaches to the transfer, but only becomes applicable 
if the rights are retransferred during a formal outbreak.  The framework is a 
basic IP licensing agreement developed or adopted by the public-sector 
institution and previously agreed to by the initial licensee.  When an outbreak 
occurs, if the licensee does not work the technology within a certain period of 
  
352. See R&D BLUEPRINT, supra note 7, at 6. 
353. Note that these agreements included IP provisions and other contractual arrangements. 
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time354 and refuses to license it, then any entity ready to meet the terms of the 
framework would become the new licensee through notification to the public-
sector institution—and payment, set in the framework by reference to the 
original licensing agreement, to the first licensee. 
1. The Need for Streamlined IP Frameworks 
The possibility of a hold-up of IP rights during the early stages of an 
outbreak is arguably the most detrimental of the inefficiencies identified in 
Parts I and II.  Outbreak diseases are among the most severely underfunded 
diseases, with very limited support for R&D, if any.  An outbreak opens up a 
unique and short-lived window for R&D resource maximization.  This was 
evidenced by the 258 percent increase in Ebola funding during the first year of 
the outbreak, a number that has since declined.355  Similarly, the 2015 outbreak 
jumpstarted Zika R&D, with one of the major funders suspending funding for 
the development of a vaccine less than a year after the outbreak ended.356 
The importance of capitalizing on the narrow period in which an outbreak 
disease becomes a source of concern stretches across many domains.  For 
instance, initial clinical trials for Ebola vaccine candidates were hampered by a 
declining number of Ebola-related infections as the outbreak began to wind 
up,357 a problem that affects the pace of outbreak-spiked R&D.  But perhaps no 
domain is as crucial as the transfer of intellectual property covering existing 
vaccine technologies.  Companies with not-fully-developed vaccine candidates 
in their portfolios may struggle to muster the resources needed to quickly 
produce and test the vaccine, as illustrated by the Ebola case study presented in 
Part II.  They may also engage in a strategy of immediate profit maximization, 
  
354. The exact amount of time would be based on the characteristics of the technology in question.  
(For example, for the type of vaccine or proximity to preexisting vaccine technology as the case 
studies on Ebola and Zika illustrated, in some situations there will be preexisting vaccines that 
can be adapted to respond to new outbreaks, whereas in others we will face a vaccine vacuum.) 
355. See POLICY CURES RESEARCH, supra note 49, at 6. 
356. Pasteur, supra note 319 and accompanying text.  Residual financial support for the 
monitoring of Zika mosquitos and disease transmission is still ongoing. 
357. See Alexandra Sifferlin, Lack of Ebola Cases Shifts Vaccine Trials Away From Liberia, TIME 
(Mar. 13, 2015), http://time.com/3743945/ebola-vaccine-trials [http://perma.cc/MZ6N-
YN3X] (describing the decision of the National Institutes of Health to relocate the clinical 
trials of an Ebola vaccine candidate from Liberia to Guinea due to the impossibility of 
enrolling volunteers who were at risk for Ebola infection after the outbreak in Liberia was 
contained). 
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electing to wait to license their vaccine technology to the highest bidder once an 
outbreak sparks demand.358 
The inability to push incipient vaccine candidates through the R&D 
pipeline as soon as an outbreak begins—or the strategic choice to delay the 
licensing of vaccine technology—is at odds with the extraordinary funding 
suddenly made available for research on otherwise overlooked diseases.  
Delayed transfers of IP at this stage are especially problematic, as funding might 
start to shrink by the time the licensee finally begins testing and developing the 
vaccine technology.  IP hold-up, either due to lack of R&D capacity or rent-
seeking behavior, squanders the opportunity of maximizing R&D at peak 
funding.  Consider again the case of NewLink’s Ebola vaccine.  Emergency 
status for Ebola began in August 2014 and ended in March 2016.359  In this 
context, the three-month period in which the vaccine was not developed 
(August to November 2014) is much more significant than a similar delay in 
R&D for mainstream diseases, where funding is unlikely to decline. 
As outbreaks swiftly alter the funding landscape for certain diseases, the 
need to ensure efficient transfers of IP rights over much-needed technology—
in particular, vaccines—is paramount.  Against this backdrop, a streamlined 
mechanism to operate these transfers is especially well-suited to address the 
specific dynamics introduced by outbreaks.  A streamlined framework 
individuates ex ante the core IP provisions that must be agreed upon for a 
transfer to occur.  This feature reduces transaction costs once an outbreak 
begins, hence speeding IP negotiations and, as a consequence, the development 
of technologies for which funding is temporary. 
A streamlined IP framework may take different forms, ranging from a set 
of narrowly defined rights and conditions that parties include in their licensing 
agreements, to more generic provisions (akin to guiding principles).  The 
former has the advantage of being a more efficient tool for speeding up the 
licensing process: The more densely populated a framework, the less bargaining 
remains once the technology is needed.  The latter still requires some degree of 
filling in activity by negotiating parties.  But while a more specific IP 
framework is better to hasten negotiations during a public health crisis, it also 
  
358. NewLink acquired rights over rVSV-ZEBOV from the Canadian government for U.S. 
$205,000 and later transferred them to Merck for U.S. $30 million (to which an extra U.S. 
$20 million could be added under certain conditions).  See supra note 295 and 
accompanying text.  The profit made by the company was made solely on the basis of 
having acquired a technology for which there was sudden demand, with no development 
on NewLink’s part.  This fact will not be lost on smaller companies unable or unwilling to 
innovate in traditionally competitive areas. 
359. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 159; Branswell, supra note 161. 
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poses the risk of low adherence, as companies might be reluctant to agree ex 
ante to a broad set of provisions.  Conversely, a more loosely delineated 
framework may be more attractive ex ante. 
2. Benefits of a Dormant License 
A dormant license, as proposed in this Article, is an embodiment of a 
more stringent IP framework.  It therefore has the advantage of being a more 
efficient tool for accelerating IP negotiations, and the drawback of being 
possibly unattractive to parties unwilling to commit ex ante (for example, 
private-sector companies with some degree of bargaining power). 
Yet, given the specificities of outbreak-disease R&D, such a stringent 
mechanism is also the most appropriate.  A porous framework is of little to no 
use in the context of outbreaks.  If crucial provisions have not been agreed 
upon, gains in negotiation speed will likely be minimal.  The potential for 
disagreement is still considerable among companies interested in the transfer of 
IP.  Moreover, a looser framework is unlikely to solve the problem posed by 
companies engaging in profit maximization by waiting for the highest bidder to 
enter the negotiation process.  Even more critically, inaction from such a 
company—by not developing the technology—has to be explicitly addressed ex 
ante, which is the main function of a dormant license. 
As described above, a license that is negotiated ex ante is the most efficient 
way of avoiding delays once an outbreak begins and funding streams open.  
Such a license shifts the bulk of transaction costs pre-outbreak.  A powerful 
argument in favor of a dormant license is that R&D on outbreak diseases will 
remain very low during pre-outbreak periods, and hence unattractive to 
major private-sector companies.  As seen with Ebola and Zika, existing pre-
outbreak vaccine technology, if any, is likely to be developed by the public 
sector.  When existing technology is transferred to the private sector before an 
outbreak, the licensee will likely be a smaller pharmaceutical company, as 
illustrated by the case of the Ebola vaccine candidate licensed to a small Iowa-
based company.360  Smaller companies that cannot compete in mainstream 
drug R&D are natural candidates for government-developed technologies 
approaching the clinical-trial stage.361  As outbreaks increase in periodicity and 
  
360. See NEWLINK GENETICS, supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
361. Typically, the government turns over the later stages of R&D to private sector companies, 
large and small.  Having borne the risk of initial development of a drug, as well as 
associated costs, government research institutions lack the funding to manufacture most 
drugs and see them through clinical trials.  An example of this was the attempted licensing 
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scale, acquisition of vaccine technology before an outbreak constitutes an 
increasingly viable business strategy.  In a playing field in which smaller players 
abound, the likelihood of adoption of a stringent licensing mechanism 
increases: These players have less bargaining power vis-à-vis government 
institutions than large pharmaceutical companies, and comparatively more to 
gain from the development of outbreak-related technology. 
In the context of outbreak-disease R&D, another benefit of a dormant 
license is that it puts pressure on companies to develop the technology through 
a catalytic event that coincides with a spike in funding.  Even if a smaller 
company that has licensed a vaccine from the government is unable to work it 
pre-outbreak, a dormant license becomes a Sword of Damocles only once an 
outbreak starts.  At this point, funders are exceptionally quick to mobilize.  And 
because a dormant license only springs to life with the formal declaration of an 
emergency, even smaller pharmaceutical companies have time to mobilize 
resources and attract additional funding before the license clock starts ticking. 
In addition to the informal stages of the outbreak, in which the license is 
still dormant, there is also a period of time after the trigger event during which 
companies can start the development of the technology, before having to 
license it to others.  For purposes of starting the license clock, the triggering 
event can be a declaration from the WHO or the NIH, or a standard developed 
by the public-sector institution licensing the invention in the first place.  
Because formal outbreak declarations tend to lag,362 this gives companies a 
reasonable timeline for moving vaccines through the R&D pipeline. 
The fact that the license is dormant also assuages concerns of companies 
that intend to develop technology licensed pre-outbreak, even if prospectively.  
In a scenario in which a company diligently begins R&D once an outbreak 
occurs, the license does not spring to life.  Moreover, it is reasonable to expect 
most companies, however small, to be legitimately interested in the 
development of vaccines and drugs in general as opposed to pursuing rent-
seeking strategies.  In fact, there is an increasing number of small biotechnology 
  
deal between the Army and private-sector company Sanofi regarding the Zika vaccine.  
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 226 and accompanying text.  Government partnerships with 
private-sector companies also occur outside the sphere of outbreak diseases, or even 
underfunded ones, encompassing most mainstream drugs.  Take the case of oncologic drugs, 
for which the National Institutes of Health routinely partner with different pharmaceutical 
companies.  See NIH Partners With 11 Leading Biopharmaceutical Companies to Accelerate the 
Development of New Cancer Immunotherapy Strategies for More Patients, NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-partners-11-
leading-biopharmaceutical-companies-accelerate-development-new-cancer-immunotherapy-
strategies-more-patients [https://perma.cc/7N3F-YS9X]. 
362. See Roland, supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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startups that are considered more innovative than traditional, large 
pharmaceutical companies.363  In this sense, a dormant license does not 
constitute a deterrent to companies negotiating vaccine technology with 
public-sector institutions. 
However, one advantage of a dormant license embedded in a larger 
licensing agreement is that it serves as a deterrent to companies focused on 
immediate profit maximization through retransfer of IP.  In this case, it is more 
efficient for this type of company to look for technologies that are not subject to 
dormant licensing provisions, a move that gives them more time to seek out the 
licensing deal that generates the most revenue.  And in the event that a rent-
seeking company agrees to a dormant license (or switches its business model 
after acquiring the technology), it then has a limited period of time in which to 
transfer the technology.  This minimizes the impact of IP hold-up and provides 
companies interested in licensing the technology with a timeframe in which to 
prepare to compete in the R&D arena. 
Because licensees under a dormant license model develop the technology 
on a nonexclusive basis, this proposal promotes competition.  However, 
competition-enhancing measures may generate too much competition, to the 
point at which no companies have incentives to license the technology in the 
first place.  This may of course happen if a plethora of nonexclusive licenses are 
granted through the dormant license regime.  Nevertheless, there are two 
factors that attenuate this possibility.  On the one hand, there are additional 
funding streams available, combined with the uncertainty inherent to 
outbreaks of infectious diseases.  At the time the decision to license on a 
nonexclusive basis is made, the outcome of the outbreak is unknown; it may 
end soon or last for years, creating a very large market for new drugs and 
vaccines.  The flipside of the risk posed by increased competition is that 
forgoing the opportunity to enter an R&D race might also entail missing out on 
a blockbuster market. 
On the other hand, outbreak-spiked R&D is uber-competitive, even in 
the absence of nonexclusive licenses.  As illustrated by the case of Zika R&D, 
shortly after the outbreak began, there were around forty entities involved 
in the Zika vaccine race.364  Among these entities, there were twenty-seven 
different vaccine candidates in development in mid-2017, as detailed in 
Table 2.  A closer look at these candidates shows that several candidates were 
  
363. See Jennifer Alsever, Big Pharma Innovation in Small Places, FORTUNE (May 13, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/13/big-pharma-biotech-startups [https://perma.cc/PQ5Z-HJXN]. 
364. See supra Table 2. 
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based on exactly the same technology (for example, inactivated purified virus 
or DNA vaccines).  The history of vaccine development is marked by 
simultaneous R&D on similar technologies, with outbreaks accentuating the 
race-like aspects of vaccine development.365  Against this backdrop, the 
potential drawback of unrestrained competition triggered by a dormant license 
becomes less significant.  In addition to this, the Patent Act already establishes 
that public-sector technology transferred to private companies should be 
preferentially licensed on a nonexclusive basis,366 which further dilutes 
concerns posed by excessive competition. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that this proposal is designed as a response 
to the idiosyncratic problems posed by R&D on outbreak diseases.  It can 
be applied to any kind of outbreak-funded technology, including diag-
nostics, therapeutics, and vector-control methods.367  The most relevant field 
of application is nonetheless vaccine technology, not only because the field of 
vaccine R&D is the primary recipient of outbreak funding, but also because 
of the preventive role of vaccines on outbreak outcomes and their positive 
impact on health systems.368 
D. IP Preparedness in the Post-Outbreak 
As seen above, the successful development of an Ebola or Zika vaccine does 
not necessarily mean that it will be widely available or affordable.  As costly R&D 
for outbreak diseases faces an uncertain market in which to recoup costs, 
exploitation of patent rights in monopoly-like conditions often leads to a 
scenario in which those most in need of a therapy or vaccine cannot access it.369 
Several institutions, especially in the nonprofit arena, are increasingly 
adopting IP policies to ensure widespread availability and affordability of 
health technologies.  One of the most prominent examples is the policy pursued 
by the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi).370  While DNDi 
  
365. See generally MEREDITH WADMAN, THE VACCINE RACE: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE 
HUMAN COSTS OF DEFEATING DISEASE (2017) (providing an in-depth account of the race 
surrounding the first polio vaccine). 
366. 35 U.S.C. §§ 207–209 (2012). 
367. See supra Table 2. 
368. See Nathalie Largeron et al., Role of Vaccination in the Sustainability of Healthcare Systems, 
3 J MKT. ACCESS HEALTH POL’Y 1 (2015). 
369. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
370. INNOVATIVE VECTOR CONTROL CONSORTIUM, supra note 335 and accompanying text.  
DNDi’s IP policy, as stated in the organization’s business plan, is guided by the “need to 
ensure that drugs are affordable to and access is equitable for patients who need them” and 
“the desire to develop drugs as public goods when possible.”  See DNDi’s Intellectual 
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recognizes that it will have to enter into contractual relationships that include 
acquisition, management, or enforcement of IP, the institution’s default 
strategy “does not seek to finance its research and operations through IP rent 
revenues.”371  Although an exhaustive description of DNDi’s business model is 
beyond the scope of this Part of the Article, a few examples illustrate the 
overarching concept: The organization does not support R&D projects 
requiring the use of preexisting IP at a cost that does not (financially) allow for 
follow-up R&D to be performed in-house or out-contracted by DNDi;372 it 
develops and licenses health technologies according to principles of 
maximization of availability and affordability of drugs instead of “restrictive IP 
strategies that maximize patent revenue;”373 and it uses model agreements “to 
enable alternative forms of dispute resolution” as a way to avoid litigation.374 
This is not to say that the approach taken by DNDi is scalable.375  But these 
are principles that should inform IP and health innovation policies in other 
sectors.  To provide but one practical example—and drawing from the case 
study on the attempted licensure of the Army’s Zika vaccine—several of 
DNDi’s principles (or adaptations thereof) could be read as best practices for 
the licensing of health innovations funded by the public-sector.  Drawing 
further from the example of the case study on Zika, a modest but meaningful 
improvement would be to require public-sector entities to fully disclose terms 
of proposed licenses when complying with the notice requirement set forth in 
35 U.S.C. § 209(e).  This provision requires federal agencies to give a simple 
notice of intent to license and also to consider comments received in response 
to the note, but it is silent on the disclosure of substantive information about 
the license beyond the exclusivity.  § 209(e) could be amended to require 
disclosure of at least some elements, like the term of the license, termination, 
and pricing provisions. 
  
Property Policy, DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, https://www.dndi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/03/ip%20policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6LN-86L5]. 
371. Id. at III and IV. 
372. Id. at V. 
373. Id. at III. 
374. Id. at VI. 
375. Small institutions like DNDi operate on limited budgets, which do not allow for R&D in certain 
areas to be conducted.  See Funding, DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, 
https://www.dndi.org/achievements/asaq/partnership-overview-2/funding [https://perma.cc/ 
C7JW-7YR4]. 
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CONCLUSION 
Outbreak diseases place an enormous burden on public health.  Yet they 
fit poorly into the patent-based incentives mold, which causes R&D on 
outbreak pathogens to be grossly underfunded.  Moreover, even when large-
scale outbreaks cause a spike in funding, outbreak-induced R&D can be 
plagued by different types of IP inefficiencies that affect the ongoing 
development of health technologies, as well as the future availability and 
affordability of vaccines, therapies, and diagnostics for outbreak diseases.  
Through case studies on the Ebola and Zika vaccine races, I have taken the first 
steps in identifying, characterizing and analyzing the manifold interactions 
between IP and vaccine development in the context of outbreak diseases.  It has 
also sought to survey legal and policy mechanisms that mitigate the 
shortcomings and amplify the successes of the IP of Ebola and Zika, making the 
lessons from the case studies applicable to other outbreak diseases.  Further, it 
has put forth a new solution—a dormant license—that has the potential to 
greatly reduce an especially problematic type of transactional IP inefficiency in 
the early stages of an outbreak.  As new and old pathogens erupt in increasingly 
complex ways, increasing our IP preparedness by lessening the impact of these 
inefficiencies will remain a critical task. 
 
